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Abstract 
In this paper we demonstrate the way in which class origin shapes earnings in higher 
professional and managerial employment. Taking advantage of newly released class origin data 
in Britain’s Labour Force Survey, we examine both the relative openness of different high-status 
occupations and the earnings of the upwardly mobile within them. In terms of access, we find a 
distinction between “traditional” professions, such as law, medicine and finance, which are 
dominated by the children of higher managers and professionals, and more technical occupations 
such as engineering and IT that recruit more widely. However, even when those who are not 
from professional or managerial backgrounds are successful in entering high-status occupations, 
they earn sixteen percent less, on average, than those from privileged backgrounds. This class-
origin pay gap translates to up to £7,350 ($11,000) lower annual earnings. This difference is 
partly explained by the upwardly mobile being employed in smaller firms and working outside 
London, but it remains substantial even net of a variety of important predictors of earnings. 
These findings underline the value of investigating differences in mobility 
rates between individual occupations as well as illustrating how, beyond entry, the mobile often 
face an earnings “class ceiling” within high-status occupations.
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Introduction 
People in higher professional and managerial occupations tend to command large 
incomes, exercise substantial power in their workplaces, and pass significant advantages on to 
their children. In sociology, there is a rich history of research looking at social mobility into such 
high-status occupations (Lipset and Bendix 1991; Stanworth and Giddens 1974; Heath 1981; 
Hout 1984). However, in recent decades this line of enquiry has been largely abandoned as 
researchers have increasingly focused their attention on debates surrounding generalised rates of 
mobility and how best to interpret them (e.g. Bukodi et al. 2014). Moreover, when looking at 
these generalised rates, most sociologists have followed the lead of Goldthorpe and concentrated 
on examining mobility into “big classes” such as the EGP schema in the US or the National 
Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) in the UK. As Hout (2015) recently noted in 
an essay on the state of mobility research, this usually involves directing attention to standard 
mobility tables, comparing origin and destinations taken from two points in time, and measured 
with a single occupation-based variable. In many national contexts we therefore know a great 
deal about mobility between large categories of occupations but little about the potentially 
important differences that exist within these big classes.  
We argue here that class analysis needs an approach which registers class destinations 
more effectively. An important move towards this has been put forth by Weeden and Grusky’s 
“micro-class” concept (Weeden and Grusky 2005). Indeed, as we will show in this paper, one 
can only understand the full effects of class origin in Britain when destinations are broken down 
into specific “micro-class” occupational groups. This is because the effect of “big” class origins 
varies substantially between and within particular occupations, in ways which are obscured using 
standard mobility tables.  
But this is only a first step. Nearly all sociological research—in the United States, 
Britain, and beyond—conceptualises social mobility as an issue of occupational access1, whether 
at the “big class” (Goldthorpe) or “micro-class” (Weeden-Grusky) level. While occupation is 
clearly important, one problem with both these theoretical approaches is that they ignore the 
differences in resources people bring with them into occupations, as well as the different rewards 
they reap once there. Here we instead advocate an approach rooted in Bourdieusian theory 
(Bourdieu 1987), and recent Bourdieu-inspired research (Atkinson 2010; Savage et al. 2014; 
                                                          
1
 For a notable exception see Buhlmann (2010). 
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Flemmen 2012), which stresses that class position can only be fully understood as the sum total 
of resources at a person’s disposal: most centrally earnings and education, as well other forms of 
economic, cultural, and social capital. While many of these are strongly associated with 
occupation, and occupational access may indeed be the best single proxy class analysis has at its 
disposal, it is important to recognise that it does not fully, or even adequately, capture the effects 
of social origin on a person’s class destination. In fact, there is a wealth of research indicating 
that class origin matters well into the life course, and particularly in high-status occupations. This 
work stresses that even when individuals do experience occupational upward mobility they still 
face challenges stemming from their different social, economic, and cultural resources, class 
bias, or a sense of emotional dislocation (Lareau, 2015; Rivera 2015; Skeggs 1997; Friedman 
2015; Ashley 2015).  
Following in this vein, this paper advances a new way of conducting class analysis to 
make it better able to investigate specific forms of class-origin inequality within big-class and 
micro-class occupational groups. In developing this agenda, we borrow the concept of “glass 
ceiling” which has been used extensively by feminist scholars to examine the hidden barriers—in 
terms of earnings and occupational position—experienced by women and ethnic minorities 
(McGovern et al. 2007; Davies 2011; Babcock et al. 2003; Wilson, Sakura-Lemessy, and West 
1999). We show here that there is also a “class ceiling” at play, which prevents upwardly mobile 
members of high-status occupations from enjoying equivalent earnings to those who come from 
intergenerationally stable backgrounds. This, we argue, not only points toward a previously 
undetected form of intra-occupational inequality, but also underlines the theoretical limitations of 
using occupation alone to understand class destination. Our results suggest, for example, that a 
Glasgow-based lawyer earning £50,000/year whose parents were factory workers is not 
meaningfully in the same class destination as a City of London lawyer earning £75,000, raised in 
a family of lawyers.     
Our analysis capitalises on newly released UK Labour Force Survey Data to provide the 
first large-scale and representative study of social mobility into and within Britain’s higher 
professional and managerial occupations
2
. The article investigates two key research questions. 
First, we examine whether upward mobility is more common into some NS-SEC 1 occupations 
than others. Second, we move beyond the issue of occupational “access” to examine how the 
                                                          
2
 The most relevant antecedent is Heath (1981). 
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upwardly mobile fare once they have entered NS-SEC 1 occupations. In particular, we ask, do 
the mobile attain the same levels of earnings as those from more privileged backgrounds? If not, 
can this be explained by differences in educational qualifications, human capital or work context 
between the two groups, or does a “class ceiling” persist when we compare otherwise-similar 
people from different class backgrounds?  
 
Background and Theory 
 
Mobility into Higher Professional and Managerial occupations  
Over the last 20 years the goal of increasing social mobility has become a rare point of 
convergence among Britain’s political parties (Milburn 2012). At the root of this is a widely-
held anxiety that mobility is declining. This concern has been fuelled by economists who 
point toward a significant decrease in upward income mobility (Blanden et al. 2004; Blanden, 
Gregg, and Macmillan 2007). However, their findings have been disputed by sociologists 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe 2010; Goldthorpe 2013) who have stressed the importance of 
measuring mobility in terms of occupational class rather than income, and using this approach 
find that relative mobility rates have remained fairly constant. 
 This heated debate is important, but has detracted attention from a number of key 
issues of social reproduction and inequality that we take up in this article. In particular, the 
focus has remained fixated on general aggregate mobility rates (or inflow and outflow rates 
into seven big-class categories) rather than examining how rates of mobility vary among 
smaller groups, such as higher professional and managerial occupations. This more focused 
approach did historically play a central role in “status-attainment” approaches to class (Blau 
and Duncan 1967; Stanworth and Giddens 1974; Bielby 1981; Heath 1981). However, it was 
effectively critiqued by Goldthorpe et al (1980), who argued that status attainment approaches 
failed to place elite mobility within the context of broader shifts in the post-war class 
structure, particularly the “more room at the top” expansion of professional and managerial 
jobs. 
Goldthorpe’s critique was rightly influential, but it has also acted to stymie more 
minute and granular analyses of mobility into particular occupations, which is especially 
important for understanding dynamics at the higher levels of the social structure. Whilst it is 
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clearly inadequate to examine inflow into high-status occupations as if this is the only, or 
even main, task for social mobility research, we contend that it remains a pivotal question to 
explore empirically, particularly in a contemporary context where the power and resources of 
those at the top of the social hierarchy are becoming more entrenched (Gilens 2012; Dorling 
2014; Piketty 2014).  
There are also two important conceptual reasons for reviving this kind of analysis. First, 
in the process of aggregating all higher professional and managerial occupations into “big class” 
categories such as NS-SEC 1 or EGP 1
3
, the specific dynamics of occupational contexts remain 
hidden. In particular, individual occupations with distinct histories, work and market situations, 
entry requirements and recruitment structures are problematically classified together (Weeden 
and Grusky 2005).  
Second, and linked to this, examining mobility into aggregated “top-class” categories 
may mask important distinctions or fractures within these social groups. In class analysis, 
divisions of this kind have been the subject of longstanding debate, from Wrightian (Wright and 
Wright 1998) concerns about types of ‘assets’ to the Bourdeusian (1984) divide between 
“dominant” occupations situated at different ends of the ‘capital composition’ axis. In Britain 
these debates have focused largely on divisions between management and the professions. 
Although NS-SEC 1 does officially separate these sectors, distinguishing NS-SEC 1.1 (“large 
employers and higher managerial and administrative occupations”) from NS-SEC 1.2 (“higher 
professional occupations”), these are almost never operationalised in contemporary mobility 
studies (for notable exemplars of this omission see Bukodi et al. 2014; Li and Devine 2011; 
Goldthorpe and Mills 2008). Yet these “situs” have distinct histories. Unlike many capitalist 
nations where a unified “service class” developed in the 19th century, in Britain only a state-
sponsored professional class emerged at this time. When a managerial sector began to appear at 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century, this assumed a “subordinate” position within the service class, 
lacking cultural capital and dependent on capitalist employers. This historical legacy continued 
to set these two sectors apart throughout the 20
th
 century, with the professions enjoying greater 
job security and cultural capital (Savage et al. 1992; Butler and Savage 1995). There is therefore 
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 The NS-SEC was developed from a sociological classification known as the Goldthorpe 
Schema (Goldthorpe et al. 1980; Erikson and Goldthorpe 2010) and is now widely used in both 
official statistics and academic research in the UK.  
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good reason to explore, as we do here, whether these groups remain distinct in their ability to 
reproduce themselves.  
The question of how to develop a more occupationally-specific analysis of social 
mobility has been advanced in the US, particularly by Grusky, Weeden and their various 
collaborators (e.g. Grusky and Sørensen 1998; Jonsson et al. 2009). These authors argue that it is 
at the localized level of disaggregated occupational groups that the key processes of class 
formation – social closure and reproduction, identification and awareness, collective 
mobilization and exploitation—can most clearly be seen to emerge. Drawing on US surveys with 
large sample sizes, these authors demonstrate that substantial differences in mobility 
exist between individual occupational groups, which they argue should subsequently be 
understood as “micro-classes.”  
One problem with the “micro-class” approach, however, is that like Goldthorpian 
“big-class” analysis, it tends to remain tied to mobility tables that track identical origins and 
destinations. This means that it frequently elides the question of how big-class origins may 
affect micro-class destinations. Thus while a micro-class perspective may effectively capture 
the specialised resources that a doctor may transmit to his/her children (that will advantage 
them in the field of medicine), it is still important to ask what kinds of resources come from 
parents’ big-class position, and how this may also profoundly affect their children’s 
occupational destination. Moreover, we contend that this is a particularly important issue for 
sociology to address as it allows us to identify the precise channels through which 
intergenerational class inequalities are reproduced or, put another way, the particular 
occupations where diffuse big class resources can be effectively “cashed in.”  
Until now the kind of large-scale representative data needed to conduct this kind of 
analysis (i.e containing large sample sizes and detailed social origin data) has simply not been 
available in the UK. In this way, the newly released LFS data we draw on here provides an 
unprecedented opportunity. In its July-September 2014 quarterly survey the LFS, the largest 
representative sample of employment in the UK (n=95,950), included for the first time 
detailed questions on parental occupation. Drawing on the addition of this social origin 
variable, we first examine mobility inflow rates among higher professional and managerial 
occupations in Britain, and ask whether mobility is more common into some sectors or 
occupations than others. 
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Class and the “Glass Ceiling” 
Another by-product of the dominant focus on big-class mobility rates is that it reduces 
social mobility to a one-dimensional measure of occupational entry. More specifically, it 
simply compares two (or occasionally three) moments in a respondent’s life—i.e. social 
origin, current job and occasionally also first job (Goldthorpe et al. 1980; Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992). This is problematic because it conflates occupational access with class 
position, and inadvertently suggests that all individuals enter occupations on an equal footing. 
Yet while those from working-class backgrounds may secure admission into elite 
occupations, they do not necessarily enter with the same resources as those from more 
privileged backgrounds, and therefore do not necessarily achieve the same levels of success.  
The issue of relative success within occupations has been much more effectively explored 
in relation to the experiences of women and ethnic minorities. Here studies have consistently 
demonstrated the considerable hidden barriers, or “glass ceilings,” that women and ethnic 
minorities face (Davies 2011; Cohen and Huffman 2007). Such barriers manifest in myriad 
forms. First, there is reliable evidence that a “gender pay gap” exists in most professional and 
managerial occupations, even when a wide array of variables are controlled for (e.g. Gorman and 
Kmec 2009; Petersen and Morgan 1995). The same is true for certain ethnic groups (Wilson, 
Sakura-Lemessy, and West 1999; Brynin and Güveli 2012). Other research points to the lack of 
women in senior positions in fields as diverse as law, culture and business (Hagan and Kay 1995; 
Cohen, Huffman, and Knauer 2009; Griffiths, Miles, and Savage 2008). 
While questions of class origin are largely absent from work on “glass ceilings” or pay 
gaps, we believe these concepts may be usefully imported into the field of class analysis. In 
particular, there is already some evidence that origin has a persistent impact on labour market 
outcomes, particularly earnings. In Norway, for example, the work of Hanssen (2001a; 
2001b) and Flemmen (2009) has shown how those originating in the highest social classes go 
on to obtain the highest level of economic rewards
4
.  
Until recently such illuminating work has not been matched in the UK. However, 
recent work (Authors, 2015) drawing on the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) found that 
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 A similar effect has been reported in the US (Torche, 2011: 796), although curiously is only 
mentioned in passing by the author.  
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even when those from routine/semi-routine backgrounds enter NS-SEC 1 occupations, they 
are less likely to accumulate the same economic, cultural and social capital as those from 
privileged backgrounds. While many such differences can be explained by the direct 
inheritance of wealth, social connections, legitimate tastes and educational opportunities, the 
authors also found that the mobile have considerably lower average incomes, pointing toward 
the kind of “glass ceiling” normally associated with women and ethnic minorities. Indeed, 
even when controlling for education, location, age, and cultural and social capital, the 
upwardly mobile had, on average, considerably lower annual incomes (£8-14k) than higher-
origin colleagues.  
While these results point toward lingering class disadvantage within NS-SEC 1, the 
GBCS data have three important limitations. First, the GBCS was a self-selecting web-based 
survey, and therefore the nature of the data means it is not possible to use it for statistical 
inference about the national population (Savage et al. 2014). Second, the income question in 
the GBCS was insufficiently precise: it asked about net annual household income in wide 
bands rather than having any measure of individual earnings. Third, the GBCS lacked detailed 
questions concerning respondents’ employment situation, including measures of the types of 
mechanisms shown to affect earnings in other studies of wage gaps. 
In contrast the LFS data we draw upon here corrects for each of these problems; it is a 
random sample, nationally representative survey; it contains detailed and accurate measures 
of individual earnings and employment context; and, perhaps most significantly, it includes 
variables that allow us to analyse three key areas widely thought to affect earnings. First, it 
includes measures of educational attainment, and specifically whether a respondent has 
attended university. This may be particularly telling in a British context, as the average wage 
return to a degree remains high in both absolute and comparative terms (Walker and Zhu 
2010; Gregg et al. 2013; Jerrim 2012). Second, it is routinely hypothesised in some sections 
of sociology (Becker 1962; Coleman 1988; Groot and Oosterbeek 1994), and certainly within 
neo-classical economics (Piketty, 2014: 20-21), that inequalities in earnings can be explained 
largely in terms of human capital. Here we examine this thesis directly via both educational 
attainment and other key human capital measures such as job tenure, job training and health. 
Finally, the LFS also includes measures of an individual’s work context that are known to be 
associated with distinct occupational advantages, such as working in London (Cunningham 
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and Savage 2015), in big firms (Ashley, 2015) and in the private versus public sector (ONS, 
2014)
5
. 
The LFS data thus facilitates a much more in-depth investigation into whether, beyond 
entry, the mobile continue to face lingering disadvantage within Britain’s higher professional 
and managerial occupations. Specifically, it allows us to examine not only the relationship 
between social origin and income, but also whether this relationship can be accounted for by 
other pertinent social differences between the mobile and the stable.  
 
Data & Methods 
We draw here on newly-released data from the UK Labour Force Survey that provides, 
for the first time, detailed information about parental occupation. Drawing on this social origin 
variable we begin by examining the parental occupations of respondents employed in Class 1 of 
the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) —denoting “Higher managerial, 
administrative and professional occupations.”6 Throughout the article our analysis examines 
divisions within NS-SEC 1 as a whole, its two constituent sectors—NS-SEC 1.1 and 1.2—and 
finally 63 individual occupational titles within NS-SEC 1
7
 which we combine throughout into 15 
larger occupational groups. Our goal in creating these was to account for occupational groupings 
with similar training, skills and work contexts (Hout 1984), while also having a sufficiently large 
n within each group to allow for meaningful inference. Drawing on the work of Weeden and 
Grusky (2005), eight of the groups can be conceptualised as micro-classes. Two of these are 
composed of one occupation each (medical practitioners and higher education teachers, both of 
which have their own SOC 2010 code), and six additional groups are made up of closely related 
occupations: law, engineering, scientists, accountants, IT professionals, and finance managers. 
The remaining seven occupational groups are necessarily more ad-hoc, but have been grouped so 
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 This is of course not a comprehensive account of everything that affects earnings. We do not 
have measures, for example, of respondents’ social networks or social capital, cultural capital, or 
their parents’ education or economic capital, all of which are likely to be important. 
6
 This is essentially the same as Class I of the Goldthorpe-derived scheme also used in the US 
and international comparisons, also called Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero or EGP based on 
their seminal article (1979).  
7
 These are the 60 SOC 2010 codes assigned to NS-SEC 1 in the ONS’s simplified analytic 
scheme, plus three additional occupations (taxation experts, information technology and 
telecommunications directors, and functional managers and directors n.e.c) with more than 35 
LFS respondents assigned to NS-SEC 1 (NS-SEC assignment is not based solely on SOC code). 
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as to be as coherent as possible. The individual occupations and occupational groups are 
presented in Table 2 below. 
It is important to explain how we operationalise social mobility. In order to measure 
respondent’s social origin we refer to the LFS question asking respondents aged over 15 the 
occupation of the main earner parent when they were 14. We then group respondents’ social 
origin into the eight NS-SEC classes.
 8
 In order to simplify our analyses, we consolidate these 
further at various points in the paper. Here we use a four-class scheme, comparing NS-SEC-1 
origins (higher managers and professionals, the intergenerationally stable), to NS-SEC 2 (lower 
managers and professionals, short-range upwardly mobile), NS-SEC 3, 4 and 5, (intermediate 
and clerical occupations
9
, mid-range mobile) and NS-SEC 6, 7 and 8 (routine and semi-routine 
occupations and those with no earning family member
10
, long-range mobile). We also use 
respondents’ parents’ specific occupations to identify those who are in the same occupational 
group as their main income-earning parent. We code these respondents as “micro(class)-stable” 
and occasionally we refer to those who are stable in NS-SEC 1 occupations but not in the same 
group as their parents as the “macro(class)-stable.” 
We draw on a sample of 95,950 respondents from the July-September 2014 LFS Wave. 
We remove all those under 23
11
 and/or in full-time education from the analyses. We also omit 
those over 69, as the LFS collects data on those over 69 differently, since most people in this age 
group have moved into retirement. This leaves 43,444 respondents between the ages of 23 and 
69 who have sufficient origin information to assign to one of the above groups, and 6,104 in NS-
SEC 1 occupations. The LFS uses a rolling longitudinal design, where respondents are surveyed 
in each of five consecutive quarters, with a fifth of the survey entering and another fifth leaving 
in each quarter. Not all questions are asked of each respondent in each quarter, however; most 
importantly for our purposes, respondents only answer earnings questions in their first and final 
                                                          
8
 We use Table 10 from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/classifications/current-
standard-classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec--rebased-on-soc2010--user-
manual/index.html at ONS, the “simplified scheme” to match parents’ 4-digit SOC2010 
occupational codes to the analytic NS-SEC categorization.  
9
 This includes occupations which are normally self-employed, and technically skilled and craft 
occupations. 
10
 People who said there was no one earning in their household at age 14. 
11
 Although it is standard in mobility table analyses to only look at those age 30 or 35 or over, we 
include the widest reasonable age range because we are interested in the composition of NS-SEC 
1, not mobility chances by origin. 
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quarters in the survey. Thus, in order to access earnings data (as well as detailed information for 
respondents’ social origins) we obtained a special license for this data. This allowed us to link 
records across four quarterly LFS questionnaires so that we had earnings data for as many people 
as possible who answered the social origin question. This resulted in a sample of 3510 NS-SEC 1 
respondents who also have earnings information, and 3377 with data on all covariates used in 
regression models. 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps: first, we describe the social origins of those in 
different NS-SEC 1 occupations. Second, we compare the earnings averages
12
 of those in these 
occupations according to their social origin, then model the extent to which class origins predict 
earnings net of a host of controls, and decompose the earnings difference into portions that are 
“explained” and “unexplained” by our models. Third, we compare the class pay gap within NS-
SEC 1 disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, age, and smaller occupational groups.  
 
Origins and Destinations 
We begin by providing the most up-to-date analysis of rates of social mobility into 
Britain’s higher professional and managerial occupations. Table 1 demonstrates the distribution 
of social origins of respondents in NS-SEC 1 occupations as well as the sub-categories of NS-
SEC 1.1 and 1.2. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1
13
 displays two key findings. First, it demonstrates that those in NS-SEC 1 
occupations are disproportionately drawn from privileged occupational backgrounds. More 
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 The Labour Force Survey provides multiple measures of earnings. We take the natural log of 
weekly gross earnings, a constructed variable provided by LFS based on the respondent’s 
earnings over their reported pay period. When presenting and discussing our results, we use the 
exponentiated values or coefficients; coefficients can be directly interpreted as percentages (e.g. 
a coefficient of .90 indicates a 10% decrease in predicted earnings for a move of one unit in that 
variable). . We also analysed hourly earnings and untransformed weekly income (analyses 
available upon request) and obtained substantively similar results.  
13
 Tables 1 and 2 examine occupations at the time the origins question was asked—the July-
September 2014 wave of the LFS; analyses in the remainder of the paper, which look at earnings, 
use the respondent’s reported occupation at the time the earnings question was asked. For 
roughly two-fifths of respondents this was also July-September 2014; the other three fifths 
reported earnings 1 to 3 quarters earlier. See Data Note in Appendix for fuller explanation. 
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specifically, those from NS-SEC 1 backgrounds are nearly twice as common in NS-SEC 1 as in 
the general population (26.6% vs 14.1%), while the relationship for people with parents who 
worked in routine employment is reversed: they constitute 18.3% of the population but only 
9.5% of NS-SEC 1. It is clear, then, that Goldthorpian “big class” origins are strongly associated 
with “big class” destinations.  
Second, however, Table 1 also reveals substantial differences in the relationship between 
social origins and destinations between the managerial and professional sectors of NS-SEC 1. In 
particular, we find that the greater social exclusivity of the professions—originally highlighted 
by Savage et al (1992)—persists in contemporary Britain, with significantly higher inflow rates 
of recruitment into higher managerial occupations than into the higher professions. It is also 
worth noting here that higher managers in our sample earn on average 24% more than higher 
professionals (see Appendix Table A1). This is significant because it suggests that greater 
economic capital does not necessarily map onto greater social closure in a UK context.  
One of the main advantages of the new LFS data is that it also allows us to move beyond 
big classes, or even class sectors, toward a more fine-grained analysis of mobility into individual 
high-status occupations. Table 2 (and Figure 1) display rates of recruitment and reproduction into 
the 63 occupational titles, and 15 occupational groups, that make up NS-SEC 1. Table 2 and 
Figure 1 are both sorted by the relative “openness” of these 15 occupational groups. The first 
column of Table 2 also reports rates of intergenerational “micro-class” reproduction for each of 
these occupational groups—that is where occupational group destination directly matches 
parental occupational group origin (e.g respondents in law whose main-earner parent was also in 
law); this group is a subset of the intergenerationally stable. Figure 1 illustrates the extent to 
which each origin group is over- or under-represented in each of the occupational destination 
groups as compared to their prevalence in the population (of 23 to 69 year olds) as a whole; that 
is, a value of 1 for long-range mobile would indicate that the same proportion of people from 
working-class backgrounds are in that occupational group as there are in our target population.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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Table 2 and Figure 1 demonstrate that NS-SEC 1 is by no means a coherent “class” in 
terms of the origins of its incumbents.
14
 On the contrary, there is tremendous diversity in the 
exclusiveness of different high-status occupations in Britain
15
. First, it is possible to detect a 
pattern of distinct micro-class reproduction, where children with parents in medicine and law are 
21 and 18 times (respectively) more common in these fields than in the population as a whole 
(see Appendix Figure A1). On the other hand, rates of micro-class reproduction are much lower 
in other occupational groups; children of people in accounting, for example, are only about 1.75 
times as common in accounting occupations as elsewhere.  
Second, Table 2 illustrates that the broader social origins of those in different elite 
occupations also vary considerably. For example, while 53% of doctors
16
 are the children of 
higher managers and professionals, only 16% of senior public sector managers and professionals 
have similarly privileged roots. Echoing the recent results of Authors (2015), Figure 1 and Table 
2 also suggest a telling distinction within these occupations between the traditional and the 
technical. For example, the traditional—or “gentlemanly” (Miles and Savage 2012)—professions 
of law, medicine, finance, life science, academia and science contain a particularly high 
concentration of those from NS-SEC 1 backgrounds, with the intergenerationally stable 
overrepresented by a factor of more than two in each case. Similarly, Table 2 also illustrates that 
these traditional professionals are among the most “closed” to those from relatively 
disadvantaged backgrounds: less than 7% of doctors, veterinarians, dentists or physical scientists, 
for example, are from routine or semi-routine working class or no-earner family origins.  
In contrast, we can identify a set of technical professions in the form of engineering, IT 
and the built environment that contain a higher than average percentage (compared to NS-SEC 1 
as a whole) of those who have been upwardly mobile. Furthermore, in certain public sector 
occupations, such as public sector managers and protective civil servants, the majority have not 
come from professional or managerial backgrounds
17
.  
                                                          
14
 Appendix table A3 gives standard errors and confidence intervals for the percentage stable in 
each of our 15 occupational groups.  
15
 The patterns reported are for all respondents in these occupations between the ages of 23 and 
69; further analysis might examine differences by gender, ethnicity, or age group; our purpose 
here is to capture the overall composition of each occupation by social origin. 
16
 This is very similar to the rates of reproduction identified by Miles (1999) for 1839-1914 data.  
17
 The intergenerationally stable are still slightly overrepresented compared to the population as a 
whole. 
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          These findings are significant in two main ways. First, they underline the limitations of 
using big-classes like NS-SEC 1 to understand the social composition of the top end of the 
occupational order. In Britain at least, this elides an important distinction between higher 
professionals and managers (Savage et al. 1992). While higher managers earn more, the higher 
professions remain significantly more elitist in terms of restricting access for those from working 
class backgrounds (Macmillan 2009). Second, our results indicate that the long-standing 
theoretical tendency to pitch big-class mobility analysis against micro-class approaches has acted 
to shut down important analytical avenues. In particular, both of these approaches proceed from 
the logic of the standard mobility table. Yet by looking asymmetrically at both macro and micro-
class origins and destinations, our analysis underlines the importance of resources that stem from 
both big- and micro-level class origins. While microclass reproduction is especially strong in 
certain areas like law and medicine, it is really at the level of micro-class destination that, contra 
Goldthorpe, the effects of big-class origins are brought sharply into focus: we see the largest 
proportions of the intergenerationally stable within specific occupations such as veterinarians, 
dentists, airline pilots, and those working in finance, science and academia.  
 
Introducing the Class Ceiling 
While our analysis so far has demonstrated wide variations in the openness of different 
high-status occupations, it does not tell us how those from lower origins fare relative to others 
within NS-SEC 1 occupations. To tap this intra-occupational question, we analyse logged weekly 
gross earnings. While earnings do not necessarily provide a definitive measure of occupational 
position, or level of prestige, it is the best available proxy and also an important marker of 
success in its own right. Figure 2 therefore shows the average logged weekly gross earnings of 
respondents in NS-SEC 1 occupations, according to their social origins.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that there are substantial and significant earnings differences 
among those in NS-SEC 1 occupations, according to their social origin. Those whose parents 
were in higher managerial and professional occupations have (geometric) mean earnings of £844 
a week, while those who have been upwardly mobile earn on average £56 to £173 less per week, 
14 
 
depending on the range of their mobility. Particularly striking here is the pay gap encountered by 
those from working-class (NS-SEC 6, 7 and 8) backgrounds, who as a group earn an average of 
only 83% as much as intergenerationally stable, which translates into £141 less per week, or an 
annual difference of about £7350 ($11,000)
18
. These differences are not only substantial but also 
statistically significant: the average logged earnings of each origin group are lower than the 
stable at p<.05, as is the difference between those from routine manual or non-earner households 
and the overall mean across all of NS-SEC 1. 
Of course, a simple distribution of earnings averages cannot tell us whether the upwardly 
mobile face a “class ceiling” or pay discrimination, or whether they are simply different from the 
inter-generationally stable in other respects. In order to disentangle potential sources of class-
origin income difference, in Table 3 we show a series of nested linear regressions that control for 
four sets of factors that we identified in our literature review as sources of income inequality. In 
the base model, we include controls for gender, ethnicity and age as well as for paid hours 
worked and the quarter in which the respondent gave earnings information
19
. In Model 2, we add 
measures of education: the highest degree or qualification the respondent has achieved, and their 
degree classification
20. Model 3 adds additional measures of “human capital” – training, job 
tenure and current and past health
21
; Model 4 adds work context: the region of the UK in which 
the respondent worked, the industry her job was in, whether she worked in the public or private 
sector, the size of the firm at which she worked, and whether her occupation is classified as NS-
SEC 1.1 or 1.2. Finally, in Model 5, we add dummy variables for each of the individual 
occupations in NS-SEC 1. Coefficients are exponentiated, and can therefore be understood as 
giving the predicted percentage change in earnings for a one-unit change in the independent 
variable (e.g. the coefficient of .792 for those with NS-SEC 7 parents in Model 1 indicates 
predicted earnings 79.2% those for NS-SEC 1-origin respondents). 
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 Because we are using logged income, these are geometric rather than arithmetic means. The 
percentage differences between categories using arithmetic means are roughly similar, but the 
figures in GBP are larger: the difference between the stable and the long-range mobile arithmetic 
mean weekly income is £165, which is £8614/year or nearly $13,000. 
19
 See Appendix for sources and distributions of all variables used in regressions. Individual 
occupation coefficients not shown in Table 3. 
20
 British undergraduate degrees are classified categorically on a 5-point scale – “first-class”, 
“2:1”, “2:2”, “third” and “pass.”  
21
 Higher values on each of these health scales indicate greater levels of health problems, see 
Appendix for more detail. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 shows that even when we control for all of these variables, the class pay gap 
remains across NS-SEC 1. More specifically, in Model 5, with all the controls included, the pay 
gap remains statistically significant for all those from NS-SEC 3-8 social origins. Moreover, 
there is still a substantial difference in earnings by origin— 9-12 percent, which translates to 
£4342 ($6500) per year
22
 lower earnings for those from NS-SEC 6-8 as compared with the mean 
for NS-SEC 1 origins—between respondents who are otherwise similar in every way we can 
measure. Significantly, this is very similar in size and persistence to the estimate of the gender 
wage gap, where we find women earning 88.2% of otherwise-similar men in NS-SEC 1. This is 
worth underlining. Even when the upwardly mobile are successful in entering Britain’s higher 
professional and managerial occupations, our results make clear that they face a powerful “class 
ceiling” that persists even when we control for a range of factors believed to affect earnings.  
  
Decomposing The Class Pay Gap 
While Table 3 points to a previously undetected class pay gap, it also allows us – in 
conjunction with Table 4—to unravel some of the mechanisms responsible for driving this 
inequality. Although we cannot conduct a proper causal analysis here, in Table 4 we conduct a 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder 1973; Jann 2008) to see how much the measured 
attributes of the upwardly mobile account for how much of the class pay gap
23
. This model uses 
the same variables as the full model in Column 5 of Table 3, but simply compares those who are 
mid- or long-range upwardly mobile to the intergenerationally stable
24
. Overall, measured 
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 Calculated based on a model which groups NS-SEC 6-8 origins together (predicted earnings 
for this group as a whole are 10.4% less than for the stable). The annual difference is larger—
£5,500—when the dependent variable is untransformed weekly earnings.  
23
 This is the standard approach for studies of gender and other earnings gaps (Weichselbaumer 
and Winter-Ebmer 2005); the procedure conducts separate regressions for each group, allowing 
each group’s attributes/control variables to affect their predicted earnings differently.  The 
observed gap in earnings can then be attributed to differences between the groups and other 
(“unexplained”) differences.  
24
 We exclude this group because they represent minimal upward mobility (many analyses in fact 
treat moves from NS-SEC 2 to 1 as stability), and because they do not have significantly lower 
earnings than the stable in most of our analyses. 
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differences between the stable and the upwardly mobile account for 46% of the class pay gap but 
54% remains unexplained.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The percentages in the second column of Table 4 can be read as the amount that the pay 
gap would increase (negative) or decrease (positive) if the upwardly mobile had the same 
average values on those measures as the intergenerationally stable. For example, the negative 
24% for age in Column 2, is due to people with intermediate- or working-class parents being 
older, on average, than those with parents who were in NS-SEC 1; if the average ages of the two 
groups were the same, the pay gap between them would be 24% larger. (These negative effects 
mean that other effects can and do account for more than the total percentage of explained 
difference.)  
Table 4 demonstrates that differences in educational attainment account for 45% of the 
earnings gap. This is because those in NS-SEC 1 from working- or intermediate-class origins are 
less likely to have attained university or post-graduate degrees, and people with higher degrees 
tend to earn more; if the upwardly mobile had the same levels of qualifications as the stable, and 
none of their other attributes changed, the earnings gap would be (just under) half what it is. 
Conversely, differences in degree classification are not a strong contributor to the pay gap; all the 
explanatory work is done by qualifications.  
It is important to note here, however, that the LFS lacks more fine-grained educational 
measures such as private schooling and elite university attendance, which are known to be 
strongly associated with both class origin and earnings in the UK (Macmillan, Tyler, and 
Vignoles 2014; Crawford and Vignoles 2014). Indeed, in previous work on the class ceiling 
within the Great British Class Survey (Authors, 2015), controls for whether or not respondents 
had attended private schools and/or elite universities contributed substantially to the class pay 
gap.   
Model 3 shows earnings once “human capital” measures of job tenure, training and health 
are added. However, Table 4 makes clear that differences in human capital make little overall 
difference, and most of the difference is negative—if the upwardly mobile had the same job 
tenure as the stable, the pay gap would actually be larger. This, along with the education 
17 
 
controls, indicates that the dominant and individualising argument that inequalities in earnings 
can largely be explained in terms of individual knowledge, credentials and skill, appears 
fundamentally limited in a UK context. 
Finally, Models 4 and 5 add measures of work context. Significantly, these appear to do 
the bulk of the work in accounting for the class pay gap. There are class-origin differences across 
all the variables included in this model, but the largest differences, and the largest effects on 
earnings, are for firm size, work region, and specific occupation. In terms of firms, people in 
companies with 500+ employees earn over 35% more than those in firms with 25 or fewer 
employees. Yet only 27% of people from working-class origins are in 500+ person firms, as 
compared with 37% of people from NS-SEC 1 origins; this difference accounts for nearly 10% 
of the class-origin pay gap. Of course it is impossible to say with these data precisely why those 
from lower class origins may not be entering the biggest and best paying firms, but recent work 
in the UK (Purcell, Elias, and Wilton 2004; Ashley 2015) has highlighted how “talent” is 
routinely evaluated by large graduate employers according to attributes rooted in middle-class 
socialisation. For example, recruiters routinely seek a “polished” appearance, strong debating 
skills, and a confident manner, traits these authors argue can be closely traced back to 
advantaged social backgrounds—what Bourdieu (1986) has termed middle-class “embodied 
cultural capital” (i.e. legitimate ways of speaking, dressing, being etc.). The work of Rivera 
(2012; 2015) has also highlighted the allied process of “cultural matching” in large elite firms, 
whereby those in senior positions, who are themselves disproportionately likely to be from stable 
backgrounds, misrecognise as merit social and cultural traits rooted in class backgrounds similar 
to their own. 
There is also a huge gradient in pay by region, with those outside London earning 
between 13% and 23% less in England, and even less in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, 
than otherwise similar NS-SEC 1 respondents whose workplaces are inside the metropolis. 
Moreover, the inter-generationally stable are more than 1.5 times as likely to work in London as 
the long-range upwardly mobile (27% vs 16%, see Table A3). Again while it is beyond our 
scope to explain the reasons the upwardly mobile are less likely to work in London, a number of 
studies in the UK suggest that graduates from working-class backgrounds are both less willing 
and less financially able to capitalise on career opportunities in the capital. They often lack the 
familial economic resources required for geographical relocation, and are less able to negotiate 
18 
 
the high costs of housing and the precariousness of the early-career labour market once in 
London
25
 (Furlong and Cartmel 2005; Pollard, Pearson, and Wilson 2004; Authors, 2015)  
Finally, as we saw in Table 2 above, there are substantial differences in the class-origin 
composition of different occupations within NS-SEC 1. These differences (and the differences in 
the average pay of these occupations; see Tables A2 and A7) explain 12.3% of the pay gap. 
 Taken together the variables in Model 5 account for almost half of the difference in 
earnings between the upwardly mobile and the intergenerationally stable. Yet, this leaves 54% of 
the difference “unexplained.” The data at hand cannot account for this “unexplained” class pay 
gap. However, here we suggest two conceptual possibilities. First, it may be that the class pay 
gap can be explained by the behaviours, practices and resources of the upwardly mobile 
themselves. As previous work suggests, the mobile may specialise in less lucrative areas (Cook, 
Faulconbridge, and Muzio 2012; Ashley 2015), may be more reluctant to ask for pay raises, rely 
less on networks for work opportunities (Macmillan, Tyler, and Vignoles 2014), and in some 
cases even exclude themselves from seeking promotion because of anxieties about “fitting in” or 
abandoning class-cultural origins (Author2 2015). 
 Second, it may be that the upwardly mobile are the victims of class discrimination: that 
they are either consciously or unconsciously given fewer rewards in the workplace than those 
from more advantaged backgrounds. This may manifest as outright discrimination or snobbery 
(Author2 2015), or it may have to do with more tacit processes of homophily in contexts such as 
interviews or performance appraisals (Rivera 2012; Ashley 2015). That is, we believe many of 
the same well-documented processes that disadvantage women and ethnic minorities in the labor 
market and workplace may also affect the upwardly mobile. 
 
Disaggregating the Class Pay Gap  
While Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that the upwardly mobile face a significant pay penalty in 
higher professional and managerial occupations, it is important to deepen this analysis by asking 
whether or not this disadvantage looks the same across all of NS-SEC 1. In Figures 3-7 we 
therefore look at origin-income differences for men and women, whites and non-whites, NS-SEC 
1.1 and 1.2, and finally for each of our fifteen occupational sub-groups. For simplicity of 
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 Based on geographic distribution of industries in the UK, it is also likely that more people with 
working class origins grew up outside London.  
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presentation and interpretation, in the two-way comparisons we collapse some of the categorical 
variables into fewer categories
26
; aside from these changes, all coefficients shown in Figures 3-7 
are from models that are otherwise identical to those reported in Table 3, columns 1 and 5
27
.  
These figures were produced using coefplot in Stata (Jann 2014), and display the exponentiated 
point estimates of coefficients for origins, as well as the 90 (thicker lines)
 
and 95 percent 
confidence intervals (thinner lines).  
In terms of gender, Figure 3—combined with the predicted earnings deficit of about 12% 
for women reported in Table 3—illustrates that upwardly mobile women face a significant 
“double disadvantage” based on both class origin and gender. Long range upwardly mobile 
women have predicted earnings of about 25% less than otherwise-similar intergenerationally 
stable men.
28
 Figure 4 shows the results for separate regressions for ethnic minorities and whites, 
and Figure 5 for five different age groups. The overall patterns for all these groups are similar: 
the most disadvantage for the long-range upwardly mobile, and less disadvantage the closer 
one’s origins are to NS-SEC 1. There are not enough ethnic minorities in NS-SEC 1 occupations 
(only 300 with earnings data), however, for much statistical power: only the coefficient for long-
range upwardly mobile ethnic minorities is statistically significant. In terms of age, pay penalties 
also tend to be larger for older age groups, and do not reach significance for the 30-39 age group. 
This suggests two possible explanations: first, it could be that the class ceiling is declining across 
cohorts, although the strikingly negative coefficient for the youngest long-range mobile group 
challenges this story. Perhaps more plausibly, and in keeping with existing research, the greater 
penalties experienced by those in their 50s could be the result of a cumulative effect over the 
course of their career (Hansen 2001b; Abramson 2015). We do not have the data to adjudicate 
between these accounts here, but whatever the cause we can see a pattern of greater pay 
disadvantage among older mobile respondents.  
[Figures 3, 4 and 5 about here] 
Beyond demographic differences, it is also important to examine whether the class 
ceiling is a uniform phenomenon across all high-status occupations, or whether it is the result of 
                                                          
26
 We use the four-category origin variable described in the data and methodology section, and 
we collapse the categories for educational qualifications, degree classification, wave, firm size, 
and birth country.  
27
 Full results in Appendix. 
28
 We use a model with an interaction term for origin*female to generate this estimate.  
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a marked pay gap in certain occupations. We look at this in two different ways. First, Figure 6 
shows that the pattern of class-origin disadvantage is broadly similar across the subdivision of 
NS-SEC 1 into managers and professionals: those who have been upwardly mobile into either 
part of NS-SEC 1 from NS-SEC 3-5 or 6-8 origins face significant earnings gaps, while those 
from NS-SEC 2 origins do not
29
.   
[Figures 6, 7a and 7b about here] 
Next, we look at our 15 occupational groups. For these last analyses, we collapse origins 
into a binary variable as we did in the decomposition shown in Table 4, comparing those from 
NS-SEC 3-8 origins with those from NS-SEC 1 origins, excluding NS-SEC 2 origin respondents 
from the models. We show the coefficients from the simplified version of the “base” model in 
the first column of Table 3 (with controls only for age, gender, ethnicity, birth country, and wave 
of response) in figure 7a, and the coefficients from the simplified version of Table 3’s “full” 
model (column 5) in figure 7b. Taken together, these figures illustrate that there are striking 
levels of variation between the occupational groups in terms of the class pay gap. At one end of 
the scale, science, academia and work on built environment all have pay gaps estimated to be 
close to zero in both models. In contrast, the results reveal the scale of disadvantage experienced 
by the children of the working classes in the traditional professions of law, accountancy and 
finance. Not only are these occupations comparatively exclusive in terms of membership (see 
Table 2), but the socially mobile have predicted earnings around 20% less than their more 
socially privileged colleagues in Figure 7a. There are also substantial disadvantages for the 
upwardly mobile in comparatively more accessible occupational groups, such as IT, and among 
a number of public sector professions such as medicine where salaries are widely thought to be 
tightly regulated by the British government.  
Even after the full battery of controls, earnings differences are substantial and significant 
in six of our groups: finance, accounting, public sector professions, protective civil servants, IT 
professionals, and business professionals, and near significant in a number of others, including 
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 We also examined whether there were differences between those with NS-SEC 1.1 and 1.2 
origins; we found evidence for an earnings advantage for the children of higher managers, as 
compared with those of higher professionals, who were themselves in NS-SEC 1.1 occupations, 
and no evidence of advantage for either group in NS-SEC 1.2 or NS-SEC 1 as a whole. See 
Table A6.  
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medicine
30
. In finance, for example, the upwardly mobile have average predicted earnings less 
than 75% of the intergenerationally stable. Compared with the geometric average earnings for 
finance (see Table A2), this translates to an estimated annual pay gap of over £11,100 or about 
$16,700.
31
. This echoes similar results from previous work (Authors, 2015). 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of our analysis. While the LFS 
certainly provides the most detailed understanding of mobility into NS-SEC 1 to-date, the sample 
size for many individual occupations is small. Moreover, our results can only provide a snapshot of 
social mobility. For example, it is worth reiterating that the size and composition of many of these 
occupations in Britain has changed, and continues to change, considerably. This has an important 
bearing on our results. In 1972 when our oldest respondents were entering the workforce, for 
example, “higher salariat” occupations in Britain made up 13.6% of the (20 to 64 year old) male 
workforce (Goldthorpe, 1980 table 2.2); in the 2014 LFS data, the comparable figure has risen to 
17.2% (our analysis). Similarly, the size of individual occupations has altered significantly. While 
occupations such as IT and higher education have grown rapidly in absolute terms since the 1970s, 
other elite occupations have remained relatively stable as a proportion of the workforce. All of these 
changes have important implications for understanding our findings. In particular, the relative 
disadvantage faced by the upwardly mobile is likely to vary significantly according to the size and 
composition of their occupation when they entered, and the particular, occupationally-specific, 
cohort they were part of. Further research might examine these cohort and compositional effects in 
more detail, or compare relative and absolute rates of mobility into NS-SEC 1 occupations.  
 
Conclusion 
This article provides the most fine-grained analysis to date of social mobility into and 
within Britain’s higher professional and managerial occupations. The analysis contains two key 
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 Table A2 shows that these results are quite robust, whether the dependent variable is logged 
earnings, untransformed earnings, or earning percentile within each microclass. It further shows 
that while the controls explain the gap between the stable and the upwardly mobile as a group in 
law, there are significant differences between micro-class stable lawyers (the children of 
lawyers) and those from NS-SEC 1 origins with parents not in law, as well as between the long-
range upwardly mobile and the stable.  
31
 This may in fact be an under-estimate given the prevalence and size of annual pay bonuses in 
banking and finance, however the data on bonuses available in the LFS are too sparse for any 
further conclusions on this issue. 
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findings. First, we uncover meaningful variation in the social composition of different higher 
managerial and professional occupations; while “traditional” professions, such as medicine, law 
and finance, remain dominated by the children of managers and professionals, more technical 
occupations such as engineering and IT appear to recruit more widely. Second, we demonstrate 
that even when those from non-professional and managerial backgrounds are successful in 
entering many of Britain’s most prestigious occupations, they face a powerful “class ceiling” in 
terms of earnings. This pay gap persists even after controlling for important factors such as age, 
gender, ethnic origin, education, human capital and various aspects of work context. This, we 
believe, points toward worrying and previously unobserved
32
 disadvantage within some of 
Britain’s most prestigious and highly-paid occupations – particularly in finance and 
accountancy.  
A number of mechanisms that may be at work in producing this class pay gap. In 
particular, we find that the most prominent drivers (accounting for over 30%) are aspects of work 
context – specifically which particular occupations individuals enter, the greater likelihood that 
those from privileged backgrounds will enter bigger firms, and that their employment will be in 
London. In other words, a good portion of the gap is accounted for by what could be termed 
sorting mechanisms: although all respondents are employed in NS-SEC 1 they work in different 
places and different contexts, which in turn has a large effect on their earnings.  
It is important to reiterate that this still leaves over 50% of the class pay gap 
“unexplained.” Clearly, follow-up work is needed to interrogate this unaccounted difference. We 
would stress, however, that any such future work should focus on the numerous resources 
associated with class origin that we cannot measure here, such as parental income and wealth, 
powerful social networks, elite private school or university attendance, and cultural tastes or 
practices with widely shared legitimacy.  
We also believe our approach and findings have two important implications for class 
analysis. First, we show that existing social mobility research fails to effectively capture the 
persistent impact of class origin in shaping people’s lives. Both big-class and micro-class 
approaches proceed from the logic of the standard mobility table which compares identically 
measured social origins and destinations at usually two points in time. However, we believe this 
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 It is important to stress that we are not suggesting that the class pay gap is necessarily new, 
however.  
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fundamentally elides the “stickiness” of class origin. In particular, it fails to capture how the 
resources that flow from class origin often shape individual lifecourses well beyond occupational 
entry. To some researchers of class, this may seem a somewhat banal observation. After all a 
wealth of qualitative research indicates that class identities tend to always carry – at least in some 
form—the symbolic baggage of the past, and this historical imprint often has important 
consequences for how people act in the present (Skeggs 1997; Lareau 2015). However, in the 
dominant quantitative arena of class analysis, sensitivity to the linger of class origin is often 
absent. In this regard, we believe our introduction of the feminist concept of a “glass ceiling” 
may act as a vital means of sharpening the tools of class analysis. In particular, it provides an 
analytic strategy with which researchers can begin, as we have done here, to interrogate the 
hidden barriers that those from low class origins may face within elite or prestigious occupations.  
Second and very much relatedly, we believe these analyses demonstrate that a person’s 
class destination is never fully captured by big-class or micro-class occupational variables. Big-
classes simply hide too much pertinent information. Occupations within NS-SEC1, for example, 
are characterised by huge variation in rates of mobility, differences that surely shed important 
light on the precise channels through which intergenerational class inequality is reproduced. Yet 
meso- and micro- classes are also not sufficient for understanding destination. While these 
groupings certainly provide a more accurate indication—their members are clearly closer in 
earnings and other resources than those in their wider macro-class—even they lack information 
about intra-occupational position and earnings, and how these vary according to class origin. 
Indeed, following Bourdieu (1987) and more recently even Goldthorpe
33
, we argue here that a 
full understanding of class destination must take into account multiple indicators of social 
position or resources. Examining income and occupation in tandem, as we do here, represents 
one such way forward.  
Yet there is much more to do if we are to better understand the “long shadow” that class 
origins
34
 cast on life outcomes (Lareau, 2015). In particular we stress the need for more 
longitudinal research that can go beyond static measures of earnings and occupation to better 
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 In his keynote address to the 2014 Spring RC 28 Meeting in Budapest.  
34
 Here, we are clearly focusing on class destination, but we would also stress the need for more 
differentiated understandings of class origin, such as including measures of parental income and 
education (not available in the LFS) or examining differences between specific parental 
occupations. 
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elucidate intra-occupational trajectories and their relationship to class origin. This can be 
achieved by making further use of panel data sources, as demonstrated by (Bühlmann 2010), but 
also by using qualitative tools such as lifecourse interviews (Author2 2015) or longitudinal 
tracking of matched cohorts of employees (Bathmaker, Ingram, and Waller 2013). We also 
encourage researchers to broaden methodological repertoires away from the standard mobility 
table. In the past one of the key obstacles in operationalising more innovative and fine-grained 
approaches to social mobility has been the lack of large-scale representative data. However, 
increasingly, new sources such as tax data in the U.S (Mitnik et al. 2015) or census material in 
Norway (Flemmen 2012) are emerging to allow us to bridge this gap. Taking advantage of these 
new empirical materials, or innovations in existing data sets as we do here, is likely to continue 
to reveal previously unrecognised inequalities—such as the class ceiling—that are profoundly 
important in reproducing class disadvantage.   
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Table 1: Class Origins and Destinations, all NS-SEC categories 
 RESPONDENT’S NS-SEC GROUP/DESTINATIONS 
  1 1.1 1.2 2 3 to 8 All 
 NS-SEC 
1 ALL 
HIGHER 
MANAGERS 
HIGHER 
PROF-
ESSIONALS 
LOWER 
MANAGERS 
& PROF-
ESSIONALS 
ALL 
OTHERS TOTAL 
PARENT’S NS-SEC GROUP/ORIGINS 
      1 HIGHER MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 26.6% 23.1% 27.7% 18.5% 9.3% 14.1% 
2 LOWER MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 20.6% 17.6% 21.5% 20.4% 11.5% 15.0% 
3 INTERMEDIATE OCCUPATIONS 12.2% 12.0% 12.3% 11.5% 9.1% 10.1% 
4 SMALL EMPLOYERS & OWN ACCOUNT WORKERS 11.2% 13.6% 10.4% 12.9% 15.8% 14.4% 
5 LOWER SUPERVISORY AND TECHNICAL 10.5% 12.5% 9.9% 11.2% 12.2% 11.7% 
6 SEMI-ROUTINE OCCUPATIONS 7.1% 8.0% 6.8% 10.1% 13.9% 12.0% 
7 ROUTINE OCCUPATIONS 9.5% 11.0% 9.1% 12.9% 22.6% 18.3% 
8 NO EARNER IN HOUSEHOLD 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.6% 5.6% 4.4% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
PERCENT OF POPULATION 14.2% 3.3% 10.8% 25.1% 60.8% 100.0% 
N 6,418 1,499 4,919 11,362 27,572 45,356 
 
Note: Total n=45,356. Ages 23-69, not in full time education, with origin and destination data. Percentages 
above the total row are column percentages: they give the percent of respondents from each origin in each 
NS-SEC Class or grouping, i.e. the 26.6% in the upper left indicates that 26.6% of respondents in NS-SEC 1 
occupations have NS-SEC 1 origins. Percentages calculated using survey weights; ns are actual, unweighted 
number of respondents in each category. 
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Table 2: Social Origins of Adults (23-69) in Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations 
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Medical practitioners 17.2% 52.3% 22.4% 20.6% 4.5% 260 
Law 8.1% 40.9% 18.9% 23.8% 16.6% 219 
Barristers and judges 
 
46.6% 20.5% 13.7% 17.8% 35 
Legal professionals n.e.c. 
 
40.4% 16.5% 21.1% 22.0% 55 
Solicitors 
 
39.0% 19.1% 27.6% 13.8% 129 
Other Life Science Professionals 3.0% 37.2% 19.9% 31.8% 11.3% 183 
Speech and language therapists 
 
46.7% 36.7% 19.3% 0.0% 17 
Veterinarians 
 
45.7% 23.9% 26.1% 5.0% 26 
Dental practitioners 
 
43.0% 19.8% 31.4% 5.8% 46 
Psychologists 
 
36.6% 25.4% 32.4% 5.2% 41 
Pharmacists 
 
26.2% 9.7% 37.9% 26.2% 53 
Other Professionals 6.2% 33.5% 23.0% 25.7% 17.9% 148 
Aircraft pilots and flight engineers 
 
44.6% 21.4% 17.5% 16.8% 31 
Clergy 
 
34.4% 17.7% 30.2% 17.7% 58 
Environment professionals 
 
33.8% 17.6% 29.7% 17.6% 40 
Environmental health professionals 
 
10.3% 54.8% 14.8% 19.7% 19 
Finance 4.6% 30.3% 16.0% 38.3% 15.6% 253 
Brokers 
 
35.8% 15.8% 32.6% 15.8% 42 
Financial mngrs and directors 
 
29.1% 16.1% 39.3% 15.6% 210 
Finance and investment analysts and advisers 
 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 1 
Scientists 2.2% 29.0% 23.9% 31.7% 15.3% 256 
Biological scientists and biochemists 
 
31.7% 15.9% 33.7% 18.7% 140 
Physical scientists 
 
33.3% 37.9% 25.8% 4.7% 33 
Social and humanities scientists 
 
30.0% 17.8% 50.0% 0.0% 16 
Natural and social science professionals n.e.c. 
 
22.2% 42.9% 14.8% 19.0% 31 
Chemical scientists 
 
20.3% 25.0% 37.5% 15.6% 36 
Higher education teaching professionals 3.9% 29.0% 26.1% 30.3% 15.0% 170 
Business Professionals 2.2% 27.0% 21.7% 31.3% 20.0% 977 
Business and related research professionals 
 
31.6% 29.5% 22.1% 16.8% 45 
Management consultants and business analysts 
 
28.2% 26.9% 30.9% 14.4% 201 
Business and finan. Proj. mngmnt professionals 
 
27.7% 22.3% 33.0% 17.0% 231 
Sales accounts and business development mngrs 
 
25.8% 18.8% 30.8% 24.7% 458 
Research and development mngrs 
 
26.3% 16.3% 41.3% 16.3% 42 
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Accountants 4.6% 25.6% 18.8% 40.3% 15.7% 330 
Taxation experts 
 
29.2% 12.2% 29.2% 30.6% 39 
Chartered and certified accountants 
 
27.8% 17.5% 38.8% 16.0% 223 
Insurance underwriters 
 
16.2% 18.9% 40.5% 24.3% 36 
Actuaries, economists and statisticians 
 
16.1% 17.7% 32.3% 33.9% 32 
Built Environment Professionals 1.5% 25.5% 17.1% 37.2% 20.3% 151 
Architects 
 
28.8% 17.8% 43.2% 10.2% 62 
Chartered surveyors 
 
23.4% 17.1% 39.6% 18.9% 58 
Town planning officers 
 
21.5% 21.5% 35.4% 20.0% 31 
Managers and Directors in Business 7.3% 24.4% 17.7% 36.7% 21.2% 788 
Advertising and public relations directors 
 
47.1% 28.2% 14.1% 9.7% 17 
Purchasing mngrs and directors 
 
39.3% 7.3% 46.4% 8.3% 48 
Functional mngrs and directors n.e.c. 
 
34.2% 17.1% 25.6% 23.1% 66 
Chief executives and Snr officials 
 
30.2% 17.0% 41.5% 10.4% 56 
Marketing and sales directors 
 
29.4% 21.7% 34.4% 14.4% 88 
Human resource mngrs and directors 
 
27.1% 15.6% 38.7% 18.6% 112 
Production mngrs and dirs in mining and energy 
 
20.9% 0.0% 65.5% 15.5% 7 
Production mngrs and dirs in manufacturing 
 
17.4% 18.4% 35.7% 28.4% 332 
Property, housing and estate mngrs 
 
14.4% 18.9% 45.9% 20.7% 62 
Protective Civil Service 8.2% 24.2% 11.8% 35.9% 28.1% 83 
Officers in armed forces 
 
37.3% 3.1% 41.2% 18.8% 27 
Snr offcrs in fire, amblnc, prison and rel. srvcs 
 
23.0% 10.5% 25.6% 41.9% 24 
Snr police officers 
 
21.5% 6.1% 48.5% 22.1% 18 
Probation officers 
 
5.6% 36.3% 28.1% 29.3% 14 
Information Technology 1.9% 23.9% 24.3% 33.0% 18.9% 752 
IT and telecommunications directors 
 
31.0% 13.4% 42.3% 13.5% 38 
IT project and programme mngrs 
 
25.7% 30.9% 29.3% 14.7% 97 
IT specialist mngrs 
 
24.8% 21.9% 32.6% 20.7% 227 
Programmers and software development profs 
 
23.1% 25.2% 33.7% 17.7% 277 
IT business analysts, archtcts & systms designers 
 
20.9% 23.7% 31.3% 24.2% 113 
Engineers 8.6% 21.1% 21.2% 36.9% 20.7% 462 
Mechanical engineers 
 
30.8% 18.9% 31.4% 19.5% 89 
Civil engineers 
 
24.9% 18.1% 36.2% 20.3% 92 
Engineering professionals n.e.c. 
 
19.0% 15.5% 38.9% 26.5% 120 
Electronics engineers 
 
16.1% 22.6% 38.7% 22.6% 35 
Design and development engineers 
 
15.9% 25.6% 42.7% 15.9% 88 
Electrical engineers 
 
12.1% 39.5% 31.6% 17.1% 38 
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Note: Percentages for stable include the micro-stable.  All percentages calculated using recommended survey 
weights, n=5335 (some respondents who can be classed as NS-SEC 1 do not have 4-digit SOC 2010 codes and 
cannot be included here).  Appendix Table A7 gives Soc 2010 codes for each individual occupation, and 
standard errors for proportions from each social origin group. 
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Public Sector Managers & Professionals 1.1% 16.2% 23.7% 41.1% 19.0% 303 
Education advisers and school inspectors 
 
22.7% 22.7% 30.3% 24.2% 39 
Snr professionals of educational establishments 
 
18.0% 24.9% 39.2% 18.0% 126 
Health servcs and public health mngrs and dirs 
 
16.4% 14.8% 45.9% 23.0% 69 
Social servcs mngrs and directors 
 
10.1% 28.4% 43.1% 17.4% 60 
Elected officers and representatives 
 
0.0% 43.5% 54.7% 0.0% 9 
       Total 4.8% 27.6% 20.9% 33.4% 18.2% 5335 
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Table 3: Models of Earnings Gaps 
 
MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV MODEL V 
 
ONLY 
DEMO-
GRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
ADDING 
EDUCATION 
ADDING 
HUMAN 
CAPITAL 
ADDING 
WORK 
CONTEXT 
ADDING 
SPECIFIC 
OCCU-
PATIONS  
Origins (vs NS-SEC 1 Parents) 
     NS-SEC 2 (Lower Mgrs & Profs) 0.929** 0.946* 0.947* 0.955* 0.974 
NS-SEC 3 (Intermediate Occs) 0.880*** 0.916** 0.913*** 0.932** 0.947* 
NS-SEC 4 (Self-employed) 0.833*** 0.872*** 0.870*** 0.899*** 0.917** 
NS-SEC 5 (Lower Supervisory & Tech) 0.872*** 0.911** 0.907** 0.916** 0.937* 
NS-SEC 6 (Semi-Routine Occs) 0.818*** 0.878*** 0.874*** 0.891*** 0.911** 
NS-SEC 7 (Routine Occs) 0.792*** 0.848*** 0.845*** 0.867*** 0.883*** 
NS-SEC 8 (No Earner in Household) 0.834*** 0.886* 0.889* 0.881** 0.897* 
      
Age (in years) 1.091*** 1.095*** 1.090*** 1.085*** 1.080*** 
Age squared 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
Female 0.862*** 0.855*** 0.853*** 0.887*** 0.882*** 
Not White 1.051 1.024 1.024 1.004 0.983 
      
Country of Birth (vs England)      
Outside the UK 1.023 0.997 1.003 0.954 0.954 
Northern Ireland 0.919 0.92 0.907 1.066 1.039 
Scotland 1.002 0.98 0.976 1 1.007 
Wales 0.975 0.955 0.948 1.021 1.01 
      
Paid Hours Worked in Week 1.021*** 1.022*** 1.022*** 1.021*** 1.021*** 
      
Educational Qualifications (vs Uni Degree)      
PhD  1.01 1.011 1.065* 1.139*** 
MA  1.047 1.049 1.038 1.059* 
Post-Grad Ed Cert  0.968 0.972 1.039 1.065 
Other Post-Grad  0.994 0.995 1.065 1.014 
Higher Ed  0.810*** 0.808*** 0.827*** 0.837*** 
A-Levels  0.819*** 0.817*** 0.815*** 0.818*** 
GCSEs  0.764*** 0.763*** 0.756*** 0.751*** 
Other Qualifications  0.790** 0.796** 0.755*** 0.784*** 
No Qualifications  0.619*** 0.627*** 0.622*** 0.626*** 
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Table 3 Continued MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV MODEL V 
 
ONLY 
DEMO-
GRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
ADDING 
EDUCATION 
ADDING 
HUMAN 
CAPITAL 
ADDING 
WORK 
CONTEXT 
ADDING 
SPECIFIC 
OCCU-
PATIONS  
Degree Class (vs 2:2/Lower 2nd Class) 
     N/A (e.g. no degree, foreign degree) 
 
1.079* 1.074* 1.088** 1.075* 
Pass 
 
1.044 1.035 1.156* 1.047 
Third Class 
 
1.144* 1.137* 1.114* 1.089* 
2:1/Higher Second Class 
 
1.118*** 1.118*** 1.121*** 1.105*** 
1st Class 
 
1.116** 1.116** 1.110** 1.081* 
      
Current Health Problems Scale 
  
0.972* 0.975* 0.974** 
Past Health Problems Scale 
  
0.965 0.959 0.968 
Job Tenure in Years 
  
1.005*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 
Job-Related training last 3 months 
  
1.027 1.032* 1.024 
      
Region of Work (vs London) 
     North East 
   
0.762*** 0.776*** 
North West 
   
0.794*** 0.815*** 
Yorkshire & Humberside 
   
0.800*** 0.816*** 
East Midlands 
   
0.790*** 0.803*** 
West Midlands 
   
0.787*** 0.804*** 
Eastern 
   
0.813*** 0.827*** 
South East 
   
0.866*** 0.874*** 
South West 
   
0.799*** 0.809*** 
Wales 
   
0.736*** 0.778*** 
Scotland 
   
0.819*** 0.843*** 
North Ireland 
   
0.638*** 0.685*** 
      
Industry (vs Public Admin, Educ & Health) 
     Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
   
0.85 0.868 
Energy and water 
   
1.055 1.099 
Manufacturing 
   
1.043 1.108** 
Construction 
   
0.946 1.004 
Distribution, hotels and restaurant 
   
1.022 1.063 
Transport and communication 
   
1.163*** 1.162*** 
Banking and finance 
   
1.072* 1.102*** 
Other services 
   
0.792*** 0.94 
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Table 3 Continued MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV MODEL V 
 
ONLY 
DEMO-
GRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
ADDING 
EDUCATION 
ADDING 
HUMAN 
CAPITAL 
ADDING 
WORK 
CONTEXT 
ADDING 
SPECIFIC 
OCCU-
PATIONS  
 
Public Sector (vs Private) 
   
0.877*** 0.909*** 
      
Firm Size (vs less than 25 employees) 
     25 to 49 
   
1.257*** 1.219*** 
50 to 499 
   
1.251*** 1.219*** 
500 or more 
   
1.356*** 1.315*** 
      
Professionals (vs Managers) 
   
0.906*** 
 
      Constant 56.76*** 47.51*** 52.12*** 55.20*** 78.35*** 
      N 3377 3377 3377 3377 3377 
r2 0.222 0.268 0.275 0.386 0.433 
 
Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Coefficients are exponentiated and can be read as predicted percent 
changes. Cases missing data on any variable deleted from all models. Survey weights used. Models also 
include dummy variables for all individual occupations included in models, and for the wave in which the 
respondent reported income.  Average values for each variable for each origin group given in Appendix Table 
A3. 
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Table 4: Oaxaca Blinder Decomposition 
OVERALL 
LOGGED 
VALUES 
EXPONENTIATED 
VALUES P>T 
NS-SEC 1 origins 6.729  £  836.4  0.00 
NS-SEC 3 to 8 origins 6.582  £  721.8  0.00 
difference 0.147 115.9% 0.00 
explained 0.068 107.0% 0.00 
unexplained 0.080 108.3% 0.00 
    
EXPLAINED 
CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE PAY 
GAP 
PERCENT OF 
DIFFERENCE 
EXPLAINED P>T 
Base Model Controls 
 
-25.0% 
 Age & Age Squared -0.0351 -23.8% 0.00 
Female -0.0049 -3.4% 0.07 
Not White 0.0002 0.2% 0.70 
Country of Birth -0.0012 -0.8% 0.59 
Quarter Responded to Survey 0.0010 0.7% 0.36 
Paid Hours Worked 0.0032 2.2% 0.64 
Education 
 
45.0% 
 Educational Qualifications 0.0698 47.4% 0.00 
Degree Classification -0.0036 -2.4% 0.32 
Human Capital 
 
-5.3% 
 Current Health Problems Scale 0.0011 0.7% 0.26 
Past Health Problems Scale -0.0001 -0.1% 0.81 
Job Tenure in Years -0.0087 -5.9% 0.00 
Job-Related training last 3 months 0.0019 1.3% 0.16 
Work Context 
 
31.2% 
 Region of Work 0.0222 15.1% 0.00 
Industry -0.0039 -2.7% 0.23 
Public Sector -0.0065 -4.4% 0.03 
Firm Size 0.0142 9.6% 0.00 
Specific Occupation 0.0182 12.3% 0.02 
sum 0.0677 46.0% 
 Note: models identical to those in Column 5 of Table 3, except that only NS-SEC 3 to 8 origin respondents 
(n=1758) were compared to NS-SEC 1 origin respondents (n=887).  Variables are grouped into the same 
categories as in the 5 nested models in Table 3, and the effects for each group and sub-group of variables are 
shown, rather than individual categories for each variable. We used the “pooled” model, where the 
decomposition is based on comparing the models for each group to a pooled model containing a dummy 
variable for the groups, and included a term to make the choice of reference category for sets of dummy 
variables in the models irrelevant to the estimation of the effects of that categorical variable. Results obtained 
using the oaxaca command in Stata 13 (Jann 2008).
 
 
Figure 1: Over- and Under-Representation of Social Origins in Higher Managerial and 
Professional Occupations 
 
 
Note: All respondents age 23-69 with origin & destination information in higher managerial and 
professional occupations, not in full time education. N==5,327.  Height of bars gives the over- or 
under-representation of each origin group in each occupational group. This is generated by 
dividing the percentage of people from an origin group in each occupation by the percentage of 
people in our target population as a whole from that origin; values over 1 indicate over-
representation, and a value of exactly 1 would mean people from a given social origin are no 
more or less likely to be found in that occupational group than in the rest of the population; for 
example, it can be seen that people with NS-SEC 1 origins are over 3.5 times over-represented 
in medicine, and only about 1.15 times as likely to be found among public sector managers as 
anywhere else.  Appendix Table A7 gives standard errors for proportion stable in each 
individual occupation. 
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Figure 2: Mean Logged Weekly Earnings by Origin for those in NS-SEC 1  
 
 
Note: Mean natural log of weekly earnings for all those aged 23-69, in NS-SEC 1 occupations, 
not in full time education, with origin, destination, and earnings data, n=3510. Mean logged 
earnings given on left axis, exponentiated value on right axis.  95% confidence margins shown. 
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Figure 3: Class-Origin Earnings Gaps by Gender 
 
Note: Coefficients for upwardly mobile origins (compared to inter-generationally stable) from 
models of logged gross weekly earnings for men only (n=2097) and women only (n=1216) with 
full controls, i.e. same covariates (with some categories collapsed) as those in Column 5 of 
Table 3.  The marker is the point estimate for each coefficient, the thinner region of each bar is 
the 95% confidence interval, and the thicker region is the 90% confidence interval; bars that do 
not cross the vertical line at 1 are statistically significant at p<.05. Created in Stata 13 using the 
coefplot command (Jann 2014). 
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Figure 4: Class-Origin Earnings Gaps by Ethnicity 
 
Note: Coefficients for upwardly mobile origins (compared to inter-generationally stable) from 
models of logged gross weekly earnings for ethnic minorities only (n=300) and whites only 
(n=3013) with full controls, i.e. same covariates (with some categories collapsed) as those in 
Column 5 of Table 3.  The marker is the point estimate for each coefficient, the thinner region 
of each bar is the 95% confidence interval, and the thicker region is the 90% confidence 
interval; bars that do not cross the vertical line at 1 are statistically significant at p<.05. Created 
in Stata 13 using the coefplot command (Jann 2014). 
 
  
NS-SEC 2 Origins
NS-SEC 3-5 Origins
NS-SEC 6-8 Origins
.6 .8 1 1.2
Ethnic Minorities
Whites
 
 
Figure 5: Class-Origin Earnings Gaps by Age Group 
 
Note: Coefficients for upwardly mobile origins (compared to inter-generationally stable) from 
models of logged gross weekly earnings for each age group (n=265 for 23 -29 group, n=952 for 
30-39 group, n=1055 for 40-49 group, n=786 for 50-59 group, and n=250 for 60-69 group) with 
full controls, i.e. same covariates (with some categories collapsed) as those in Column 5 of 
Table 3.  The marker is the point estimate for each coefficient, the thinner region of each bar is 
the 95% confidence interval, and the thicker region is the 90% confidence interval; bars that do 
not cross the vertical line at 1 are statistically significant at p<.05. Created in Stata 13 using the 
coefplot command (Jann 2014). 
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Figure 6: Class-Origin Earnings Gaps in NS-SEC 1.1 vs 1.2 
 
Note: Coefficients for upwardly mobile origins (compared to inter-generationally stable) from 
models of logged gross weekly earnings for higher managers only (n=815) and higher 
professionals only (n=2498) with full controls, i.e. same covariates (with some categories 
collapsed) as those in Column 5 of Table 3.  The marker is the point estimate for each 
coefficient, the thinner region of each bar is the 95% confidence interval, and the thicker region 
is the 90% confidence interval; bars that do not cross the vertical line at 1 are statistically 
significant at p<.05. Created in Stata 13 using the coefplot command (Jann 2014). 
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Figure 7a: Class-Origin Earnings Gaps within Microclasses, Base Model  
 
Note: Coefficients for upwardly mobile origins (those from NS-SEC 3 to 7 origins, compared to 
inter-generationally stable) from models of logged gross weekly earnings for each “microclass” 
group (n=76 for Lawyers, n=129 for Finance Managers, n=164 for Public Sector Managers & 
Professionals, n=108 for Doctors, n=421 for Managers & Directors Business, n=377 for IT 
Professionals, n=47 for Protective Civil Servants, n=161 for Accountants & Related, n=501 for 
Business Professionals, n=74 for Other Life Science Professionals,  n=221 for Engineers, n=76 for 
Other Professionals, n=92 for Academics, n=60 for Built Environment Professionals, n=138 for 
Scientists) with only base controls , i.e. the same covariates (with some categories collapsed) as 
those in Column 1 of Table 3.  The marker is the point estimate for each coefficient, the thinner 
region of each bar is the 95% confidence interval, and the thicker region is the 90% confidence 
interval; bars that do not cross the vertical line at 1 are statistically significant at p<.05. Created 
in Stata 13 using the coefplot command (Jann 2014). 
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Figure 7b: Class-Origin Earnings Gaps within Microclasses, Full Model  
 
Note: Coefficients for upwardly mobile origins (those from NS-SEC 3 to 7 origins, compared to 
inter-generationally stable) from models of logged gross weekly earnings for each “microclass” 
group (n=76 for Lawyers, n=129 for Finance Managers, n=164 for Public Sector Managers & 
Professionals, n=108 for Doctors, n=421 for Managers & Directors Business, n=377 for IT 
Professionals, n=47 for Protective Civil Servants, n=161 for Accountants & Related, n=501 for 
Business Professionals, n=74 for Other Life Science Professionals,  n=221 for Engineers, n=76 for 
Other Professionals, n=92 for Academics, n=60 for Built Environment Professionals, n=138 for 
Scientists) with all controls , i.e. the same covariates (with some categories collapsed) as those 
in Column 5 of Table 3.  The marker is the point estimate for each coefficient, the thinner 
region of each bar is the 95% confidence interval, and the thicker region is the 90% confidence 
interval; bars that do not cross the vertical line at 1 are statistically significant at p<.05. Created 
in Stata 13 using the coefplot command (Jann 2014). 
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Data and Methodology Appendix 
Data note 
The UK Labour Force Survey has a uses a rolling panel survey design, with each respondent contacted in 
five consecutive quarters, but earnings only reported by each respondent in their 1st and 5th quarters of 
participation. Thus, the July-September LFS Quarterly survey data only contain earnings information for 
two-fifths of respondents willing to give earnings data (those who were in their first or fifth survey-
wave); in order to obtain a larger sample size for these analyses, data were obtained with a special user 
license from the UK Data Archive at Essex University, with permission from the Office of National 
Statistics. These records contained individual-level identifiers allowing us to link respondents for whom 
July-September 2014 was their 2nd, 3rd, or 4th wave to their first wave in the survey, and thereby obtain a 
4-quarter pooled dataset with earnings data for all eligible respondents. Earnings compared in these 
models are thus from four different consecutive quarters in 2013-14, however results for models run on 
each wave separately return substantively identical results to those reported in Table 3, and we include 
a dummy variable for survey wave/income-reporting quarter in all regressions we report. Occupations 
used in models of origin-destination association (Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1) are occupation at the time 
the origin question was asked, July-September 2014. In models of earnings (Tables 3 and 4, Figures 2-
7b), we use occupations and other variables values from the same wave as the earnings data was given; 
that is, for example, job-related-training in the last 3 months refers to three months immediately before 
earnings data.  
Weighting: the Labour Force Survey provides two weights with each survey: one for making inferences 
about earnings to the population of employed persons, and another for inference about anything other 
than income. However, the earnings weight provided was calculated based only on each quarter’s 
respondents, and is inappropriate for use with the pooled data; instead, we use the person weight 
(pwt14) given for each respondent in the July-September 2014 quarter, which accounts for attrition in 
responses over the five waves of the survey and other aspects of survey design. On comparing these 
results to those with the earnings weight (piwt14) and without weights, we found there to be no 
meaningful differences.  
Variable definitions and notes 
Exact question wordings available from the Office of National Statistics at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specific/labour-market/labour-market-
statistics/volume-2---2014.pdf.  
NS-SEC categories and Professional vs Managerial: from nsecm10 and nsecmj10 
Origin: from smsoc10, using Office of National Statistics Table 10 (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/classifications/current-standard-classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec--rebased-on-
soc2010--user-manual/index.html) to assign parents’ 4-digit occupations to NS-SEC classes; for the 325 
cases with only 3-digit soc10 origin codes, matched them to the NS-SEC class for the largest number of 
 
 
4-digit codes within that 3-digit code. The 1057 respondents with only 2-digit or 1-digit origin codes 
were not included in these analyses. 
NS-SEC Classes (including higher professional vs higher managerial distinction): from nsecm10 and 
nsecmj10.  
Occupations and Occupational Groups: from soc10m, for respondents with 4-digit occupational codes, 
grouped all those categorized as NS-SEC 1 into 15 groups. 
Micro-class origin: coded parents with 4-digit occupational codes into the same groups as used in our 
occupational groups; respondents coded as “micro-class stable” if parent was in same occupational 
group as respondent. 
Earnings: from grsswk for weekly gross earnings, from hourpay for hourly gross earnings, natural log of 
grsswk is the dependent variable in earnings analyses. 
Age, Age squared from age in years.  
Female: sex. 
Not White: from ethukeul. 
Country of Birth: from cry12. 
Paid hours: paidhru. 
Educational Qualifications: from hiqul11d and higho.  
Degree Classification: from degcls7. 
Current Health Problems Scale: ranges from 0 to 4; 0 if no current health problems reported. Sum of 
lnglst (recoded to 1 if health problem lasting more than 1 year, .5 if not sure, 0 otherwise), limact 
(recoded to 2 if health problem limits activity a lot, 1 if a little, 0 if not at all), and limita (1 if health 
problems affect work, 0 otherwise).  
Past Health Problems Scale: ranges from 0 to 2; 0 if no past health problems, 1 if any health problems 
lasting longer than one year (healyr) 2 if those also limited activity (healyl). 
Job-Related Training: from ed13wk. 
Job Tenure: from emplen, recoded into years by taking the mid-point of each category (e.g. 3 months 
but less than 6 months recoded to 0.375). 
Region of Work: gorwkr 
Industry: 1-digit industry codes, inde07m 
Public or Private Sector: from publicr 
 
 
Firm size: recode of mpnr02 
Weighting: While the LFS has separate weights for inferences about income and for other inferential 
analyses, the income weights provided are inappropriate because they do not correct for attrition from 
the survey, while the person-weights provided for respondents in the quarter in which they answered 
the origin variable do take this into account.  In these analyses, therefore, we use the person-weights, 
but results are substantively similar without weighting and with the income-specific weighting.  
 
 
Table A1: Average Earnings by NS-SEC Group 
 
MEAN 
WEEKLY 
GROSS 
EARNINGS 
STANDARD 
ERROR 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL 
HIGHER MANAGERS £  1,053 £ 35.9 £  983 £  1,124 
HIGHER PROFESSIONALS £   846 £   8.8 £  829 £   863 
LOWER MANAGERS AND PROFESSIONALS £   589 £   4.8 £  580 £   598 
NS-SEC 3-7 £   346 £   4.0 £  338 £   354 
 
Note: Total n = 17,877. Ages 23-69, not in full time education. Respondents missing 
origin or NS-SEC categorisation are excluded from the analysis. Percentages calculated 
using survey weights.  
 
  
 
 
 
Table A2: Percent Stable and Average Earnings by Occupational Group 
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Built Envir. Professionals £736 £677 6.420 0.427 
     Academics £838 £729 6.486 0.606 
     Scientists £664 £606 6.341 0.467 
     Engineers £790 £716 6.512 0.485 
     Doctors £1069 £948 6.767 0.527 
 
* ** 
 
4**, 6* 
Other Life Science Profs £642 £564 6.214 0.592 
     Lawyers £936 £817 6.584 0.526 
   
* 6*, 7** 
Protective Civil Servants £899 £835 6.622 0.391 * * * 
 
2^ 
Accountants & Related £833 £733 6.522 0.526 * ^ * 
 
6^, 7** 
IT Professionals £920 £832 6.679 0.455 ** ** * 
 
3**, 7**, 8** 
Other Professionals £740 £637 6.346 0.567 
    
7^ 
Public Sector Mgrs & Profs £769 £667 6.426 0.593 ** ** * 
 
4*, 6* 
Finance Managers £1015 £824 6.600 0.729 * ** * 
 
5*, 6* 
Managers & Dirs Business £1002 £859 6.705 0.591 
 
^ * ** 4*, 7^, 8** 
Business Professionals £858 £764 6.599 0.499 * ** * 
 
4^, 6*, 7^, 8* 
 
Note: Ages 23-69, not in full time education. Respondents missing any variable used in 
full models (see Table 3) are excluded. Coefficients from models identical to Column 5 of 
Table 3, except as noted above.  
 
 
Table A3: Variable Distributions by Origin 
 
MICRO-
STABLE STABLE (ALL) 
SHORT-
RANGE MID-RANGE 
LONG-
RANGE 
TOTAL/AVG 
ACROSS NS-SEC 
1 
n in NS-SEC 1 240 1,599 1,275 2,140 1,225 6,239 
n in analyses of earnings 185 887 732 1,138 620 3,377 
Earnings measures 
weekly gross earnings  £ 1,062   £ 960   £  892   £  826   £  800   £  873  
hourly gross earnings  £  26.60   £  25.38   £  23.56   £  22.20   £  20.86   £  23.12  
logged weekly earnings 6.83 6.73 6.66 6.60 6.56 6.64 
Demographics/Base Controls 
Paid hours 40.6 38.4 38.2 38.1 38.6 38.3 
Age (in years) 40.9 41.2 41.9 43.7 45.2 42.9 
Female 34.1% 37.7% 34.7% 34.5% 32.5% 35.1% 
Not White 8.3% 9.9% 8.5% 11.4% 8.7% 9.9% 
Birth Country       
England or UK DK 68.6% 67.2% 71.8% 72.0% 76.5% 71.4% 
outside UK 24.4% 20.7% 16.1% 14.3% 11.0% 15.9% 
Northern Ireland 0.0% 1.3% 1.6% 2.9% 2.1% 2.0% 
Scotland 4.9% 7.1% 6.1% 6.9% 8.2% 7.0% 
Wales 2.0% 3.7% 4.4% 3.9% 2.1% 3.7% 
Education 
Educational Qualifications       
Less than University Degree 15.8% 19.3% 28.6% 39.0% 49.1% 33.2% 
University Degree 51.5% 52.3% 49.0% 42.6% 39.1% 46.0% 
Post-Graduate education 32.7% 28.4% 22.4% 18.4% 11.7% 20.8% 
Degree Classification       
pass 8.5% 7.3% 5.5% 5.2% 7.3% 6.3% 
third 4.7% 4.6% 4.8% 4.1% 6.0% 4.7% 
2:2 19.2% 26.0% 24.2% 24.9% 26.1% 25.2% 
2:1 57.1% 48.1% 52.1% 49.2% 47.6% 49.3% 
first 10.6% 14.1% 13.4% 16.6% 13.0% 14.5% 
N/A (no degree,  foreign degree, 
degree w/out classes) 50.9% 48.5% 51.9% 60.7% 66.4% 56.5% 
Other Human Capital 
Current Health Problems Scale 0.408 0.345 0.389 0.392 0.393 0.379 
Past Health Problems Scale 0.107 0.064 0.063 0.054 0.036 0.056 
Job-Related Training last 3 months 46.7% 39.7% 35.5% 33.8% 30.1% 35.1% 
Job Tenure in Years 9.3 8.9 9.4 10.9 11.6 10.2 
       
Table A3 Continued MICRO- STABLE (ALL) SHORT- MID-RANGE LONG- TOTAL/AVG 
 
 
STABLE RANGE RANGE ACROSS NS-SEC 
1 
Work Context 
Professionals (vs Managers) 72.9% 78.8% 80.6% 73.7% 72.1% 76.3% 
Public sector (vs Private) 39.8% 34.2% 31.3% 30.4% 26.2% 30.9% 
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
Energy and water 1.3% 2.6% 2.0% 2.2% 3.7% 2.5% 
Manufacturing 14.8% 11.7% 14.9% 15.4% 18.2% 14.8% 
Construction 2.6% 3.1% 3.1% 4.2% 4.5% 3.7% 
Distribution, hotels and restaurant 3.6% 4.5% 4.5% 6.2% 6.8% 5.5% 
Transport and communication 7.1% 10.6% 14.7% 12.6% 11.9% 12.4% 
Banking and finance 29.1% 28.4% 24.5% 25.2% 22.2% 25.4% 
Public admin, education and health  37.3% 35.5% 33.6% 31.0% 28.9% 32.4% 
Other services 4.1% 3.5% 2.4% 2.8% 3.5% 3.0% 
Firm Size       
less than 25 16.1% 17.6% 18.9% 21.4% 21.9% 19.9% 
25 to 49 12.0% 9.9% 10.2% 11.1% 11.0% 10.6% 
50 to 499 30.7% 32.7% 34.5% 34.5% 36.0% 34.3% 
500 or more 41.1% 39.8% 36.4% 33.0% 31.1% 35.3% 
Work Region       
North East 2.1% 1.9% 2.4% 2.4% 4.4% 2.7% 
North West (inc Merseyside) 5.9% 7.4% 9.8% 10.1% 9.4% 9.2% 
Yorkshire and Humberside 5.1% 6.2% 5.9% 7.4% 9.1% 7.0% 
East Midlands 8.2% 6.7% 7.7% 7.1% 7.2% 7.1% 
West Midlands 4.7% 5.4% 7.0% 8.9% 8.9% 7.5% 
Eastern 7.6% 9.1% 6.6% 9.3% 8.5% 8.5% 
London 32.8% 26.7% 22.3% 18.4% 16.0% 21.1% 
South East 13.7% 16.6% 17.3% 14.9% 15.9% 16.0% 
South West 7.8% 9.5% 9.4% 9.7% 8.3% 9.3% 
Wales 3.1% 3.4% 3.8% 3.7% 2.8% 3.5% 
Scotland 9.0% 7.0% 7.1% 6.2% 8.5% 7.0% 
Northern Ireland 0.0% 0.2% 0.9% 1.9% 1.0% 1.1% 
(see Table 2 for origins in each specific occupation). 
  
 
 
Table A4: Separate Regressions for Men, Women, Whites, and Ethnic Minorities (Figures 3 & 4) 
 WHITES NON-WHITES WOMEN MEN 
Origins (vs NS-SEC 1 Parents)     
NS-SEC 2 (Lower Mgrs & Profs) 0.974 1.063 1.019 0.942* 
NS-SEC 3-5 (Intermediate Occs) 0.934** 0.922 0.987 0.899*** 
NS-SEC 6-8 (Semi-Routine & Occs, no earner) 0.899*** 0.791** 0.893** 0.872*** 
     
Age (in years) 1.077*** 1.041 1.079*** 1.089*** 
Age squared 0.999*** 1 0.999*** 0.999*** 
Female 0.861*** 1.02 
  
Not White 
  
1.015 0.941 
     
Country of Birth (vs England) 
    
outside UK 0.943* 1.024 0.933 0.996 
UK outside England 0.997 0.878 0.974 1.001 
Paid Hours Worked in Week 1.021*** 1.029*** 1.029*** 1.014*** 
     
Educational Qualifications (vs University Degree) 
    
Less than degree 0.800*** 0.732** 0.777*** 0.817*** 
Postgrad 1.089*** 0.961 1.083* 1.060* 
     
Degree Class (vs N/A) 
    
pass or third 0.987 1.075 1.054 0.943 
2:2 0.924* 0.982 0.907* 0.934 
first or 2:1 1.025 1.089 1.011 1.033 
     
Current Health Problems Scale 0.977* 0.976 0.961* 0.98 
Past Health Problems Scale 0.963 1.015 0.942 0.982 
Job Tenure in Years 1.005*** 0.992 1.005** 1.004** 
Job-Related training last 3 months 1.022 1.037 1.066* 1.004 
     
Region of Work: London (vs anywhere else) 1.218*** 1.245*** 1.216*** 1.198*** 
     
Industry (vs Public Administration, Educ & Health) 
    
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.837 1.288 0.644 0.957 
Energy and water 1.096 1.075 1.279* 1.054 
Manufacturing 1.080* 1.173 1.071 1.090* 
Construction 1.002 1.346 0.889 1.015 
Distribution, hotels and restaurant 1.066 0.951 1.087 1.052 
Transport and communication 1.130** 1.312* 1.102 1.177*** 
Banking and finance 1.094** 1.289* 1.101* 1.103* 
Other services 0.915 0.922 0.929 0.926 
Public Sector (vs Private) 0.900*** 0.851 0.94 0.863*** 
 
 
Table A4 Continued     
Firm Size (vs less than 25 employees) 
    
25 to 499 1.227*** 1.269** 1.207*** 1.219*** 
500 or more 1.317*** 1.487*** 1.310*** 1.316*** 
Constant 74.142*** 64.999*** 37.784*** 80.269*** 
N 3013 300 1216 2097 
r2 0.421 0.552 0.487 0.386 
 
Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cases missing data on any variable deleted from all models. Survey 
weights used.  Models also include dummy variables for all individual occupations included in models. 
Average values for each variable for each origin group given in Appendix Table A3. 
  
 
 
Table A5: Separate Regressions by Age Group (Coefficients for Figure 5) 
 
23-29 YRS 30-39 YRS 40-49 YRS 50-59 YRS 60-69YRS 
Origins (vs NS-SEC 1 Parents) 
     
NS-SEC 2 (Lower Mgrs & Profs) 1.052 1.021 0.949 0.928 1.091 
NS-SEC 3-5 (Intermediate Occs) 0.955 0.95 0.935* 0.891** 0.949 
NS-SEC 6-8 (Semi-Routine & Occs, no earner) 0.751*** 0.959 0.890** 0.850*** 0.827 
 
     
Age (in years) 0.897 1.189 1.006 1.235 1.254 
Age squared 1.003 0.998 1 0.998 0.998 
Female 0.984 0.885*** 0.862*** 0.832*** 0.849 
Not White 1.084 0.986 0.928 0.97 1.159 
 
     
Country of Birth (vs England) 
     
outside UK 1.004 1.012 0.92 0.907 1.072 
UK outside England 1.069 1.026 0.974 0.917* 1.131 
 
     
Paid Hours Worked in Week 1.028*** 1.021*** 1.018*** 1.017*** 1.029*** 
 
     
Educational Qualifications (vs University
Degree)      
Less than degree 0.806*** 0.794*** 0.761*** 0.833*** 0.975 
Postgrad 0.876* 1.052 1.067 1.173*** 1.082 
 
     
Degree Class (vs N/A) 
     
pass or third 0.814 0.989 0.93 1.143 0.851 
2:2 0.813* 0.957 0.893* 0.932 0.887 
first or 2:1 0.951 1.04 1.027 1.034 0.964 
 
     
Current Health Problems Scale 0.99 0.976 0.961* 0.957* 0.972 
Past Health Problems Scale 0.918 0.987 0.901** 1.076* 0.955 
Job Tenure in Years 0.999 0.999 1.004* 1.006** 1.008* 
Job-Related training last 3 months 1.002 1.023 1.036 1.047 1.036 
Region of Work: London (vs anywhere else) 1.244*** 1.171*** 1.273*** 1.204*** 1.352** 
 
     
  
 
 
Table A5 Continued      
Industry (vs Public Admin, Educ& Health) 
     
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
 
1.154 0.577 0.971 0.577 
Energy and water 1.285* 1.204* 0.951 1.22 0.404 
Manufacturing 1.034 1.190** 1.036 0.929 1.573* 
Construction 0.857 1.105 0.893 0.923 1.740* 
Distribution, hotels and restaurant 1.128 1.205* 1.014 0.847 1.424 
Transport and communication 1.098 1.245*** 1.081 1.069 1.595** 
Banking and finance 1.023 1.233*** 1.019 0.974 1.751** 
Other services 1.135 1.088 1.072 0.753** 0.833 
 
     
Public Sector (vs Private) 1.041 0.933 0.843*** 0.870** 0.942 
 
     
Firm Size (vs less than 25 employees) 
     
25 to 499 1.045 1.229*** 1.336*** 1.213*** 1.282** 
500 or more 1.217*** 1.326*** 1.454*** 1.305*** 1.429*** 
 
     
Constant 285.593 10.565 374.645 2.407 0.274 
N 265 952 1055 786 250 
r2 0.598 0.451 0.425 0.456 0.615 
 
Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cases missing data on any variable deleted from all models. Survey 
weights used. Models also include dummy variables for all individual occupations included in models. 
Average values for each variable for each origin group given in Appendix Table A3.   
 
 
 
Table A6: Separate regressions by NS-SEC 1.1 vs 1.2, with NS-SEC 1.1 vs 1.2 for Origins 
 
 
NS-SEC 1 All NS-SEC 1.1 NS-SEC 1.2 
    Origins (reference category varies by model) 
   NS-SEC 1.1 Parents (Higher Managers) (reference) (reference) 1.007 
NS-SEC 1.2 Parents (Higher Professionals) 0.965 0.871* (reference) 
NS-SEC 2 Parents (Lower Mgrs & Profs) 0.949 0.929 0.97 
NS-SEC 3 Parents (Intermediate Occs) 0.923* 0.891 0.939* 
NS-SEC 4 Parents (Self-employed) 0.893** 0.832** 0.928* 
NS-SEC 5 Parents (Lower Supervisory & Tech) 0.913* 0.841* 0.951 
NS-SEC 6 Parents (Semi-Routine Occs) 0.888** 0.855* 0.907** 
NS-SEC 7 Parents (Routine Occs) 0.861*** 0.829** 0.873*** 
NS-SEC 8 Parents (No Earner in Household) 0.875** 0.783* 0.909* 
    Age (in years) 1.080*** 1.083*** 1.079*** 
Age squared 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
Female 0.882*** 0.862*** 0.893*** 
Not White 0.983 0.979 0.984 
    Country of Birth (vs England) 
   Outside the UK 0.954 0.918 0.962 
Northern Ireland 1.04 1.038 1.036 
Scotland 1.008 1.053 0.994 
Wales 1.012 0.88 1.05 
    Paid Hours Worked in Week 1.021*** 1.015*** 1.023*** 
    
Educational Qualifications (vs University Degree) 
   PhD 1.140*** 1.168 1.130*** 
MA 1.060* 1.07 1.044 
Post-Grad Ed Cert 1.065 1.059 1.058 
Other Post-Grad 1.015 0.996 1.014 
Higher Ed 0.836*** 0.826** 0.840*** 
A-Levels 0.817*** 0.831** 0.814*** 
GCSEs 0.751*** 0.707*** 0.774*** 
Other Qualifications 0.784*** 0.837 0.754** 
No Qualifications 0.625*** 0.514*** 0.716*** 
    
Degree Class (vs 2:2/Lower 2nd Class) 
   Not Applicable (including no degree, foreign degree) 1.075* 1.119 1.065 
Pass 1.048 0.708 1.089 
 
 
Table A6, Continued    
(Degree Class continued) Third Class 1.089* 1.189 1.059 
2:1/Higher Second Class 1.105*** 1.166* 1.087** 
1st Class 1.083* 1.218* 1.065 
    Current Health Problems Scale 0.974** 1.001 0.968** 
Past Health Problems Scale 0.968 0.966 0.966 
Job Tenure in Years 1.004*** 1.006** 1.004** 
Job-Related training last 3 months 1.025 1.01 1.031 
    Region of Work (vs London) 
   North East 0.775*** 0.781** 0.770*** 
North West 0.814*** 0.823*** 0.812*** 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.816*** 0.742*** 0.836*** 
East Midlands 0.803*** 0.737*** 0.817*** 
West Midlands 0.803*** 0.808** 0.800*** 
Eastern 0.827*** 0.803** 0.840*** 
South East 0.873*** 0.856** 0.876*** 
South West 0.809*** 0.801*** 0.812*** 
Wales 0.778*** 0.818 0.770*** 
Scotland 0.843*** 0.769* 0.872*** 
North Ireland 0.684*** 0.721* 0.666*** 
    Industry (vs Public Administration, Educ & Health) 
   Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.869 0.762 0.943 
Energy and water 1.098 1.133 1.094 
Manufacturing 1.107** 1.077 1.117** 
Construction 1.002 0.97 1.016 
Distribution, hotels and restaurant 1.062 1.199 1.017 
Transport and communication 1.162*** 1.073 1.171*** 
Banking and finance 1.101*** 1.143* 1.085* 
Other services 0.941 0.961 0.924 
    Public Sector (vs Private) 0.908*** 0.884* 0.914** 
    Firm Size (vs less than 25 employees) 
   25 to 49 1.220*** 1.447*** 1.164*** 
50 to 499 1.220*** 1.434*** 1.172*** 
500 or more 1.317*** 1.642*** 1.242*** 
Constant 80.052*** 89.353*** 53.289*** 
    N 3377 827 2550 
r2 0.433 0.463 0.439 
 
 
 
Table 
A7  
SOC 
2010 
CODE OCCUPATION TITLE 
PER-
CENT 
STABLE SE 
95% CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL 
MEAN WEEKLY 
GROSS 
EARNINGS SE 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL N 
B
u
ilt
 
En
vi
ro
n
m
en
t 
2431 Architects 29.0% 6.0% 17.3% 40.7%  £ 780.22   £ 71.06   £ 640.90   £ 919.54  29 
2432 Town planning officers 22.3% 7.8% 7.0% 37.6%  £ 696.93   £ 49.71   £ 599.46   £ 794.40  22 
2434 Chartered surveyors 24.1% 5.8% 12.8% 35.4%  £ 742.34   £ 57.76   £ 629.10   £ 855.58  30 
Acad. 2311 Higher education teaching profs 29.8% 3.7% 22.6% 37.0%  £ 850.34   £ 32.77   £ 786.09   £ 914.60  131 
Sc
ie
n
ti
st
s 
2111 Chemical scientists 20.8% 6.8% 7.6% 34.1%  £ 589.09   £ 47.50   £ 495.97   £ 682.22  29 
2112 Biological scientists and biochemists 32.9% 4.2% 24.6% 41.2%  £ 701.16   £ 30.71   £ 640.94   £ 761.37  95 
2113 Physical scientists 32.6% 8.3% 16.3% 48.9%  £ 708.71   £ 43.58   £ 623.26   £ 794.16  27 
2114 Social and humanities scientists 30.4% 11.5% 7.8% 53.0%  £ 554.93   £ 59.70   £ 437.88   £ 671.99  9 
2119 Natural and social science profs n.e.c. 25.7% 8.5% 9.0% 42.4%  £ 561.55   £ 37.81   £ 487.42   £ 635.67  22 
En
gi
n
ee
rs
 
2121 Civil engineers 26.5% 4.9% 17.0% 36.1%  £ 808.41   £ 46.66   £ 716.92   £ 899.90  55 
2122 Mechanical engineers 31.5% 5.1% 21.6% 41.4%  £ 858.18   £ 52.93   £ 754.41   £ 961.96  54 
2123 Electrical engineers 12.4% 5.4% 1.9% 22.9%  £ 693.81   £ 59.90   £ 576.37   £ 811.25  30 
2124 Electronics engineers 18.3% 6.9% 4.9% 31.8%  £ 812.13   £ 99.80   £ 616.46   £1,007.8  15 
2126 Design and development engineers 16.0% 4.1% 8.0% 24.0%  £ 789.14   £ 45.09   £ 700.73   £ 877.55  58 
2129 Engineering professionals n.e.c. 19.2% 4.0% 11.5% 27.0%  £ 753.73   £ 42.88   £ 669.66   £ 837.81  74 
Doctors 2211 Medical practitioners 52.6% 3.3% 46.1% 59.0%  £1,066.9   £ 41.76   £ 985.01   £1,148.8  151 
O
th
er
 L
if
e 
Sc
ie
n
ce
s 
2212 Psychologists 36.4% 7.7% 21.4% 51.4%  £ 641.15   £ 55.36   £ 532.61   £ 749.69  30 
2213 Pharmacists 27.0% 6.7% 13.8% 40.2%  £ 603.65   £ 46.71   £ 512.07   £ 695.22  32 
2215 Dental practitioners 43.2% 7.5% 28.6% 57.8%  £ 777.31   £215.3   £ 355.11   £1,199.5  6 
2216 Veterinarians 46.1% 10.1% 26.2% 65.9%  £ 691.38   £ 78.20   £ 538.06   £ 844.70  13 
2223 Speech and language therapists 46.0% 12.4% 21.6% 70.4%  £ 592.63   £ 57.86   £ 479.19   £ 706.07  12 
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SOC 
2010 
CODE OCCUPATION TITLE 
PER-
CENT 
STABLE SE 
95% CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL 
MEAN WEEKLY 
GROSS 
EARNINGS SE 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL N 
La
w
 2412 Barristers and judges 54.2% 8.9% 36.9% 71.6%  £1,147.7   £141.0   £ 871.27   £1,424.2  11 
2413 Solicitors 39.8% 4.7% 30.6% 48.9%  £ 942.73   £ 59.35   £ 826.36   £1,059.1  57 
2419 Legal professionals n.e.c 42.3% 7.7% 27.3% 57.3%  £ 895.16   £141.1   £ 618.51   £1,171.8  30 
P
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
C
iv
il 
Se
rv
an
ts
 1171 Officers in armed forces 38.5% 9.6% 19.6% 57.5%  £1,203.5   £ 97.72   £1,011.9   £1,395.1  16 
1172 Snr police officers 21.6% 9.7% 2.6% 40.6%  £1,029.6   £ 42.38   £ 946.49   £1,112.7  13 
1173 Snr offcrs in fire, amblnc, prison and related 
srvcs 
23.1% 9.1% 5.2% 40.9%  £ 724.92   £ 51.62   £ 623.72   £ 826.12  18 
2443 Probation officers 5.7% 5.6% -5.3% 16.7%  £ 508.41   £ 32.04   £ 445.60   £ 571.22  10 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
n
t
s 
2421 Chartered and certified accountants 28.7% 3.1% 22.6% 34.8%  £ 802.65   £ 36.79   £ 730.52   £ 874.77  126 
2425 Actuaries, economists and Statisticians 16.7% 6.9% 3.2% 30.3%  £1,037.1   £ 117.2   £ 807.24   £1,266.9  24 
3533 Insurance underwriters 17.0% 6.4% 4.5% 29.6%  £ 650.41   £ 65.09   £ 522.79   £ 778.02  23 
3535 Taxation experts 29.4% 7.7% 14.4% 44.5%  £ 798.57   £ 75.76   £ 650.03   £ 947.10  21 
IT
 
2133 IT specialist mngrs 25.4% 3.0% 19.5% 31.3%  £ 926.36   £ 34.40   £ 858.91   £ 993.81  158 
2134 IT project and programme mngrs 26.0% 5.8% 14.6% 37.3%  £1,081.2   £ 95.03   £ 894.89   £1,267.5  66 
2135 IT business analysts, archtcts and systms 
designers 
21.2% 4.0% 13.4% 29.0%  £ 888.90   £ 44.96   £ 800.75   £ 977.05  72 
2136 Programmers & software develpmnt profs 23.7% 2.8% 18.2% 29.2%  £ 850.11   £ 35.67   £ 780.18   £ 920.05  180 
O
th
er
 
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
a
ls
 
2142 Environment professionals 34.3% 7.7% 19.3% 49.3%  £ 721.67   £ 52.14   £ 619.45   £ 823.89  28 
2444 Clergy 34.4% 6.4% 21.8% 47.0%  £ 426.99   £ 22.51   £ 382.85   £ 471.13  35 
2463 Environmental health professionals 10.7% 7.4% -3.7% 25.1%  £ 593.55   £ 46.24   £ 502.89   £ 684.21  17 
3512 Aircraft pilots and flight engineers 44.2% 9.1% 26.4% 62.0%  £1,359.8   £ 90.22   £1,182.87   £1,536.7  23 
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2010 
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CENT 
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P
u
b
lic
 S
ec
to
r 
1116 Elected officers and representatives      £ 331.24   £ 80.97   £ 172.49   £ 490.00  7 
1181 Health servcs and public health mngrs & dirs 16.7% 4.5% 7.9% 25.6%  £ 880.56   £ 41.91   £ 798.39   £ 962.72  46 
1184 Social servcs managers and directors 10.8% 3.9% 3.1% 18.5%  £ 692.36   £ 48.01   £ 598.23   £ 786.48  47 
2317 Snr professionals of educ. establishments 18.1% 3.5% 11.3% 24.9%  £ 817.10   £ 42.78   £ 733.22   £ 900.98  99 
2318 Educ advisers and school inspectors 23.9% 7.0% 10.2% 37.6%  £ 741.89   £ 89.83   £ 565.76   £ 918.02  19 
Fi
n
an
ce
 1131 Financial mngrs and directors 30.3% 6.1% 18.4% 42.2%  £1,450.33   £ 76.06   £1,301.2   £1,599.5  58 
3532 Brokers 36.7% 9.6% 17.9% 55.4%  £1,104.2   £116.5   £ 875.70   £1,332.6  23 
3534 Finance & investmnt analysts & advisers          
B
u
si
n
e
ss
 M
an
ag
er
s 
1115 Chief executives and Snr officials 30.9% 6.5% 18.1% 43.7%  £1,472.1   £ 95.42   £1,285.1   £1,659.2  42 
1121 Production mngrs and dirs in manufacturing 17.8% 2.2% 13.5% 22.2%  £ 851.21   £ 35.53   £ 781.54   £ 920.87  200 
1122 Production mngrs and dirs in construction 20.1% 17.4% -14.0% 54.3%  £1,238.1   £ 227.1  £ 792.79   £1,683.4  8 
1123 Production mngrs & dirs in mining and energy 29.5% 3.3% 23.0% 35.9%  £1,004.5   £ 52.93   £ 900.77   £1,108.3  137 
1133 Purchasing mngrs and directors 49.9% 13.0% 24.3% 75.4%  £1,254.5   £ 212.3   £ 838.19   £1,670.8  6 
1134 Advertising and public relations dirs 27.5% 4.3% 19.1% 35.9%  £1,046.7   £ 58.93   £ 931.13   £1,162.2  83 
1135 Human resource mngrs and directors 30.6% 7.7% 15.5% 45.7%  £1,236.6   £ 96.89   £1,046.7   £1,426.6  29 
1139 Functional mngrs and directors n.e.c. 35.0% 6.1% 23.0% 47.0%  £ 978.76   £ 77.83   £ 826.16   £1,131.4  51 
1251 Property, housing and estate mngrs 14.8% 4.8% 5.5% 24.2%  £ 745.33   £ 43.59   £ 659.86   £ 830.79  52 
B
u
si
n
e
ss
 P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
s 2150 Research and development mngrs 25.8% 6.9% 12.4% 39.2%  £ 914.09   £ 62.10   £ 792.34   £1,035.8  31 
2423 Management consultants and business 
analysts 
28.8% 3.4% 22.2% 35.4%  £ 923.90   £ 54.38   £ 817.28   £1,030.5  103 
2424 Business and financial project mngmnt 
professionals 
28.4% 3.1% 22.2% 34.5%  £ 925.63   £ 34.48   £ 858.01   £ 993.24  158 
2426 Business and related research profs 33.1% 8.6% 16.2% 49.9%  £ 571.67   £ 41.32   £ 490.66   £ 652.67  27 
3545 Sales accounts and business development 
mngrs 
26.7% 2.3% 22.1% 31.2%  £ 831.37   £ 24.42   £ 783.49   £ 879.24  321 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1 Microclass over- and under-representation in 15 NS-SEC 1 Microclasses 
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